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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW FOR RETRIBUTIVISTS 
ALEXANDER K.A. GREENAWALT* 
Responding to the proliferation of international criminal tribunals 
during the last two decades, scholars have engaged in a rich debate about 
the normative foundations of international criminal law (“ICL”).  The 
retributive theory of punishment—which justifies punishment based on 
the culpability of the accused, rather than by reference to its social 
benefits—has met with significant skepticism in these discussions.  Some 
have argued that unique features of international criminal justice—for 
example, the extreme selectivity of punishment or the lack of certain social 
or political preconditions—are a poor match for retributive theory.  
Others have ignored retributivism altogether, or afforded the theory only 
passing mention. 
This Article counters the anti-retributive strain by arguing that 
retributivism can indeed provide a meaningful framework for 
understanding ICL.  First, I argue that in most respects retributive theory 
is no less plausible in the international setting than it is in the domestic 
setting.  Understanding what claims retributive thinking might have 
upon ICL requires one to distinguish claims regarding the general 
justification required to defend punishment as a social practice—the core 
concern of retributive theory—from the more specific questions of 
institutional design—such as whether and when to create an 
international criminal tribunal, and how to set enforcement priorities—
that are most pertinent to ICL scholars.  I argue that, once these 
distinctions are sorted out, the anti-retributivist strain in ICL scholarship 
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does little to engage retributivism’s core claim that desert is necessary to 
morally justified punishment and provides an inherently good (if not 
exclusive) reason to punish irrespective of potential social benefits. 
I also argue that retributivism is more compatible than commonly 
supposed with current thinking about international criminal justice.  The 
theory permits various models for engaging the compromises of real world 
institutions.  It provides a powerful lens for understanding the design of 
ICL institutions such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), and it 
is also compatible with dominant approaches to institutional decisions 
such as case selection and sentencing.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, 
retributivism can also supply a framework for sometimes favoring 
alternatives to the traditional criminal prosecutions pursued by 
international courts, or even for opposing ICL altogether. 
Finally, I argue that choice of punishment philosophy has less 
practical significance for ICL than theorists often assume.  In particular, I 
argue that the choice between retributivism and other competing theories 
does little to resolve important policy dilemmas dividing theorists of ICL, 
including whether prosecution should sometimes be abandoned for 
amnesty or other alternatives.  This point supports a broader argument 
that ICL is simultaneously overdetermined and underdetermined by 
traditional punishment theory:  While the core of ICL is consistent with 
multiple theories of punishment, these theories provide only limited 
practical guidance on the most divisive questions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
What is the point of international criminal justice?  So asks 
Mirjan Damaška in an article whose title aptly summarizes a 
significant strain of international legal scholarship over the last two 
decades.1  Responding to the unprecedented proliferation of 
international criminal tribunals during this time, scholars have 
engaged in a rich debate about the normative foundations of 
international criminal law (“ICL”).  The retributive theory of 
punishment—which justifies punishment based on the culpability 
of the accused rather than by reference to its social benefits—has 
faced significant skepticism in these discussions.2 
Although theorists differ in their particular responses to 
retributivism, two general strains are apparent.  The first is a 
tendency to treat retributivism as a theory that is uniquely 
problematic in the international setting.  Robert Sloane, for 
instance, has pointed to fundamental differences between the 
domestic and international political orders that, in his view, 
diminish retributivism’s ability to guide international criminal 
justice:  “Retribution . . . emerges as a problematic justification for 
ICL punishment,” he argues, “in large part because it presupposes 
both a coherent community and a relatively stable sociopolitical or 
legal order characterized by shared values.  The circumstances that 
enable widespread violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights atrocities generally involve the breakdown of 
precisely that order.”3  Other scholars have argued that the 
selectivity in punishment for mass atrocity prevents ICL from 
serving a retributive function.  For Mark Drumbl, “[t]he retributive 
function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets 
punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for political 
                                                     
1  Mirjan R. Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice? 83 
CHI-KENT L.REV. 329 (2008). 
2  See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection 
at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 302 (2012) (“Most 
scholars who have considered the question, however, reject retribution as a 
justification for ICC adjudication, or at least they express skepticism about the 
Court’s ability to serve retributive ends.”); David S. Koller, The Faith of the 
International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 1019, 1025-26 (2008) 
(“[A]rguments from retribution have made little headway in international 
criminal law and were sharply criticized even before the first international 
tribunal was established at Nuremberg.”) 
3  Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, 43 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 81 (2007). 
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reasons anathema to Kantian deontology.”4  Arguing along similar 
lines, Diane Marie Amann observes that “[a]s a result of selectivity 
and randomness, just deserts have been meted out inconsistently, 
in very few conflicts, and on only a few defendants.  These factors 
thus have disserved the goal of retribution.”5 
These critiques withhold judgment regarding the role of 
retributivism with respect to ordinary domestic crimes.  Rather, 
they focus on features of the international setting that allegedly 
render retributivism uniquely inappropriate to ICL.  The 
purported failure of retributive considerations to justify and guide 
the contemporary practice of ICL supports broader arguments that 
ICL must resort to a unique approach to punishment, one that is 
distinct from the traditional punishment theories invoked in the 
domestic setting.6 
The second strain is that retributive theory itself receives 
relatively sparse attention.  The literature contains many, often 
passing statements about retributivism’s failures at the 
international level, but these accounts generally do not offer a well-
developed account of how a system of retributive justice is 
supposed to function.  Some accounts ignore retributivism 
altogether, and either assume or take for granted that the purpose 
of ICL is to achieve beneficial social outcomes.7  Indeed, it is 
surprising, given the attention devoted to international criminal 
legal theory over the last two decades, that the field is lacking in 
systematic applications of retributive theory to the international 
                                                     
4  MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 
(“The retributive function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets 
punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for political reasons anathema to 
Kantian deontology.”). 
5  Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L 
CRIM. L. REV. 93, 117 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
6  Sloane and Amann favor expressive approaches to international criminal 
justice.  See generally Sloane, supra note 3; Amann, supra note 5.  Drumbl advocates 
what he terms a “cosmopolitan pluralist” approach that emphasizes domestic 
alternatives to conventional criminal trials.  DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 195. 
7  See, e.g., Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The 
Disutility of Desert, 52 V.J. INT’L. L. 633 (2011) (discussing the widespread disregard 
for retributivism on the international law level); Damaška, supra note 1 (“[A] 
rigorous system for the rule of law cannot at present be established.”).  I have also 
made this assumption in a previous work.  See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice 
Without Politics?  Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 601-04 (2007) (focusing on crime prevention as the 
rationale for establishing the International Criminal Court). 
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setting.8  This is true even of scholars who have endorsed 
retributivism to a greater or lesser degree.  Scholars in this group 
either limit their analysis to a particular setting—such as 
sentencing9—or they merely identify retributive considerations—
without further analysis—as one of several rationales for 
international criminal justice.10 
This omission is unfortunate, because the question of how 
retributivism might guide a system of criminal justice is more 
complex than might be supposed, and receives no uniform answer 
even among criminal law theorists focused primarily on domestic 
institutions.  A retributivist justifies punishment by reference to the 
culpability of the accused.  That much is straightforward.  But, 
even without considering the special features of the international 
setting, this basic formulation leaves much unanswered, both 
about the basic concept of retributivism, and about the theory’s 
                                                     
8  A notable exception is Adil Haque’s elaboration of a relational theory, 
which outlines a political theory of retributivist international criminal justice.  See 
Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist 
Theory of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 272 (2005). 
9  See, e.g., Jens Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International Sentencing, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW (Goran 
Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009); Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a 
Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415 
(2001); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in 
International Criminal Trials, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 757, 757–58 (2007).  International 
criminal tribunals have also emphasized that retribution is an important goal of 
sentencing.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21/A, Judgment, ¶ 806 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (stating that “that two 
of the main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and 
retribution”).  See also Koller, supra note 2, at 1026–27 (“Arguments from the 
retributive need for punishment may continue to be adduced in certain specific 
areas, such as in justifying sentences (here again, partly as a result of the lack of a 
sufficient theory).”). 
10  See, e.g., David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality and the 
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
576 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010) (noting in passing that 
“[s]tandard justifications (retribution, general and special deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation) all raise familiar and difficult justificatory problems, 
which are no less acute in ICL than they are in domestic legal systems,” before 
arguing that “the most promising justification for international tribunals is their 
role in norm projection.”) (emphasis in original); GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2005) (noting in passing that “[a]lso, the idea of 
retribution undeniably has its place.”); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can 
International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 10 (2001) 
(maintaining that “[b]eyond retribution and the moral impulse to vindicate 
humanitarian norms, individual accountability for massive crimes is an essential 
part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic foundation for a lasting peace.”).  
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implications for the design and operation of real world justice 
institutions.  Indeed, a common critique of retributive theory is that 
it is an incomplete theory of punishment, one that fails to supply 
legislators, investigators, prosecutors, and judges with 
comprehensive guidance as they pursue justice in a world of 
imperfect knowledge and scarce resources.11 
Retributivism’s response to this challenge has decisive 
significance for the role that the theory can play in ICL.  If it is the 
case that retributivism simply does not speak to real world 
enforcement challenges, then of course, retributivism will not 
inform many of the problems of deepest interest to international 
criminal lawyers.  Making this point requires no special insights 
about ICL.  The failure is merely a reflection of a general limitation 
in the theory, one equally applicable in the domestic context.  If, on 
the other hand, retributivism can accommodate the real world 
constraints and competing values that inevitably accompany the 
realization of criminal justice, then it is worth considering whether 
and how these accommodations translate to the international 
setting. 
Targeting a gap in the literature, this Article undertakes a 
closer consideration of retributivism’s relevance to ICL.  I do not 
here advance a comprehensive defense of retributivism as the 
exclusive or optimal theory of either criminal law in general or ICL 
in particular.  Indeed, my primary agenda is not to defend an 
international criminal retributivism against skeptics, but to 
undertake the necessary preliminary step of exploring what it 
means to be a retributivist about ICL in the first instance.  
Nevertheless, I also believe there is more to be said about 
retributivism’s contribution to ICL than the literature has thus far 
explored, and that retributivism plays a greater justifying role than 
is sometimes supposed.  To that end, I advance several claims. 
First, I argue that in most respects retributive theory is no less 
plausible in the international setting than it is in the domestic 
setting.  Understanding what claims retributive thinking might 
                                                     
11  See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 308-11 
(2002) (detailing the limitations of the retributive theory); Michael T. Cahill, 
Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 815, 818 (2007) 
(“[R]etributivism, which adopts a backward-looking perspective focusing on the 
moral duty to punish past wrongdoing, is a justificatory theory, but seemingly not 
a prescriptive one.  It offers retribution as a justifying ideal but does not explain 
how legal institutions are supposed to make retribution real.”). 
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have upon ICL demands that one distinguish claims regarding the 
general justification required to defend punishment as a social 
practice—the core concern of retributive theory—from the more 
specific questions of institutional design—such as whether and 
when to create an international criminal tribunal, and how to set 
enforcement priorities—that are most pertinent to ICL scholars.  I 
argue that, once these distinctions are sorted out, the anti-
retributivist strain in ICL scholarship does little to engage 
retributivism’s core claim that desert is necessary to morally 
justified punishment and provides an inherently good (if not 
exclusive) reason to punish irrespective of potential social benefits.  
Both claims, for instance, are compatible with the conditions of 
social instability and selective punishment that typify ICL 
prosecutions. 
I also argue that retributivism is more compatible than 
commonly supposed with current thinking about international 
criminal justice.  Retributivism provides a useful lens for 
understanding the design of ICL institutions such as the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), and it is compatible with 
prevailing views on institutional decisions such as case selection 
and sentencing.  Perhaps counter-intuitively, the theory can also 
supply a framework for favoring alternatives to the traditional 
criminal prosecutions pursued by international courts, or even for 
opposing ICL altogether. 
These observations are subject, moreover, to the qualification 
that one must adhere to a version of the theory that is sufficiently 
adaptable to accommodate real world constraints.  The plausibility 
of a retributivist ICL, in other words, depends on the adoption of a 
retributivism that is itself plausible, one that looks to the desert of 
the accused as a limitation on justified punishment and as an 
intrinsic reason to punish, while also acknowledging both the 
compromises inherent in implementing a system of criminal justice 
and the sometimes overriding claims of other, non-retributive 
values. 
Finally, I argue that choice of punishment philosophy has less 
practical significance for ICL than might be assumed.  In particular 
I argue that the choice between retributivism and other competing 
theories does little to resolve important policy dilemmas dividing 
theorists of ICL, including whether prosecution should sometimes 
be abandoned for amnesty or other alternatives.  This point 
supports a broader argument that ICL is simultaneously 
overdetermined and underdetermined by traditional punishment 
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theories:  While the core of ICL is consistent with multiple 
justifications for punishment, these approaches provide only 
limited practical guidance on the most divisive questions. 
My argument proceeds in five parts.  Part 2 focuses on the 
distinction between retributive and non-retributive approaches to 
punishment.  Relying on a basic, but incomplete, account of 
retributivism, it reveals how approaches to ICL commonly 
associated with retributivism are in fact either utilitarian in nature 
or fail to engage the core claims of retributive justifications.  This 
Part focuses in particular distinguishing retributivism from 
approaches that emphasize the social benefits of desert-based 
punishment and on critiques of selectivity in ICL. 
Part 3 focuses briefly on the political theory of ICL, and 
explores ways to defend an international retributivism against 
contractarian arguments that highlight the significant differences 
between the political background of domestic and international 
justice respectively. 
Part 4 focuses on a problem that has occupied the work of some 
criminal law theorists but has thus far failed to attract significant 
attention among international scholars:  The challenge involved in 
translating retributive principles into a blueprint for real-world 
justice institutions.  This Part first explores the tensions between a 
minimalist version of retributivism which does little practical 
work, and the problems presented by a deontological 
understanding of criminal justice which appears either to impose 
an impossible, absolute duty to punish, or, by virtue of limitations 
on the duty’s reach, fails to constrain many of the most important 
questions surrounding the establishment and enforcement of ICL.  
This Part then examines the implications for ICL of two 
approaches, both figuring in the work of Michael Moore, that offer 
some accommodation between retributive goals, on the one hand, 
and the competing values and constraints that accompany the 
work of criminal justice institutions.  The first of these, 
consequentialist retributivism, treats retributive justice as a good to 
be maximized and balanced against other equivalent goods.  The 
second, threshold deontology, provides an exception to retributive 
obligations when overwhelming non-retributive considerations so 
demand.  These more flexible understandings of retributivism offer 
greater plausibility as justifications for ICL, but this plausibility 
comes at the price of significant indeterminacy, revealing that 
retributive arguments are available both to proponents of 
international prosecutorial efforts and to advocates of alternative, 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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quasi-punitive or non-punitive approaches.  Because both 
understandings also acknowledge non-retributive values, they 
undermine Moore’s suggestion that retributivism is a complete 
theory of punishment that operates to the exclusion of non-
retributive justifications. 
Part 5 identifies and qualifiedly defends a function of 
retributivism that I label “good reason retributivism.”  As the 
competing retributive theories all reveal, the most that 
retributivism can provide is a powerful, but non-exclusive, reason 
to punish.  According to this value pluralist understanding, the 
wrongdoing of the offender provides a prima facie argument in 
favor of punishment.  This understanding also acknowledges, 
however, that desert does not provide an exclusive reason to 
punish, and that both policy makers and participants in the justice 
system may balance retributive values against non-retributive 
values.  While this approach shares the indeterminacy of all 
attempts to accommodate retributivism to real world constraints, I 
indicate several reasons why good reason retributivism has 
normative force for ICL and provides a useful descriptive 
framework for understanding the existing ICL regime. 
Part 6, finally, strikes a note of caution regarding the 
significance of punishment theory for the questions most debated 
by ICL scholars.  Focusing on four specific contexts—the reach of 
substantive ICL, the debate over amnesty, case selection, and 
sentencing—it argues that consensus positions are defensible 
through multiple approaches to punishment while other questions 
will remain divisive irrespective of whether there is general 
agreement regarding the appropriate punishment philosophy. 
2. RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
Retributivism is the approach to criminal law that justifies 
punishment based on the desert of the offender.  It is in this way 
distinct from utilitarian justifications that emphasize the positive 
social consequences of punishment, such as crime prevention.  This 
brief summary provides a basic, uncontested account of 
retributivism, one that is familiar to theorists of criminal law,12 and 
                                                     
12  See Mitchell Berman, Two Types of Retributivism, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011) (“Over the 
ensuing years . . . a consensus has arisen.  As CL Ten put it in a much read book, 
‘Contemporary retributivists treat the notion of desert as central to the 
retributivist theory, punishment being justified in terms of the desert of the 
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also to ICL scholarship.13  As I shall elaborate, this statement is also 
incomplete in important ways.  For instance, it does not explain 
how a retributivist should resolve the tradeoffs that inevitably 
accompany the real world implementation of criminal justice.  It 
does not identify the weight to be given retributivism in the face of 
other competing interests.  Nor does it explain how much of the 
criminal justice system should be guided by retributive thinking.  
For example, if retributivism provides a guiding philosophy for 
judges, can it do likewise for prosecutors, as well as for legislators 
and police officers?14  Applying retributivism to such questions 
requires one to choose a distinct version of retributivism, or to 
supplement retributive thinking with consideration of other 
values. 
Nevertheless, even this basic, incomplete account of 
retributivism is instructive for appraising the role of punishment 
theory in ICL.  For one, this basic account provides a means of 
distinguishing retributive from non-retributive theories.  The best-
known competitors to retributivism are utilitarian approaches 
focused on crime prevention through deterrence, incapacitation, 
denunciation, and rehabilitation.15  One may also add to this list of 
utilitarian rationales expressive approaches to criminal law, which 
have featured prominently in ICL scholarship, although the 
classification of these approaches depends in part on what work 
the expressive capacity of criminal law is meant to do.16 
                                                     
offender.’”) (quoting CL TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 46 (1987)).  Berman 
notes that retributivists’ accounts differ as to whether it is criminal punishment 
itself, or merely suffering, that is merited by desert.  The distinction is important 
because, in the latter scenario, further explanation is required for why the state 
should establish institutions to mete out deserved suffering.  Id. 
13  See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 2, at 301 (“Although retributive theories 
take a variety of forms, all retributivists share the belief that desert justifies the 
infliction of punishment and mandates its quantity.”). 
14  See infra Part 4. 
15  See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 60-61 (Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore & Stephen J. 
Morse eds., 1999) (discussing the theories of ”incapacitation, special deterrence, 
general deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation, and retribution”). 
16  Expressive rationales that highlight the ability of criminal punishment to 
prevent crime, or realize other extrinsic social benefits are utilitarian in nature.  
For examples, see Luban, supra note 10; Amann, supra note 5; and Sloane, supra 
note 3.  If an expressive goal of punishment is to cultivate societal support for 
desert-based punishment itself, then that type of expressive rationale may be 
integrated into the variant of retributivism known as consequentialist 
retributivism.  See infra note 136 and accompanying text.  To the extent that 
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Of these, the deterrence rationale has featured especially 
prominently in the sentencing jurisprudence of international 
tribunals,17 although it has garnered substantial skepticism among 
scholars.18  But advocates of international criminal tribunals have 
put forward other, more complex and ambitious preventative 
goals.  A commonly stated aspiration is that the prosecution of 
high level-offenders can have transformative social effects in 
affected societies.  By revealing the truth about atrocities, satisfying 
victim demands for justice, and emphasizing individual over 
collective responsibility, the hope is that tribunals will help break 
cycles of violence, delegitimize criminal regimes, and promote 
transitions to peaceful liberal societies rooted in the rule of law.19  
Advocates of ICL have also emphasized the expressive potential of 
trials.  As David Luban puts it, “the most promising justification 
for international criminal tribunals is their role in norm projection: 
                                                     
expression merely forms part of the definition of punishment—in the sense that 
criminal punishment by definition expresses condemnation for wrongdoing 
whereas other harsh measures do not—then the expressive function belongs to all 
approaches to punishment, including retribution.  See LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT 
AND RETRIBUTION 45 (2006) (noting that authors of expressive or communicational 
theories of punishment “frequently . . . equivocate as to whether the moral 
censure or condemnation is part of the definition of punishment or part of what 
justifies it”). 
17  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 9, ¶ 806 (stating that “two of the 
main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and retribution.”).  
Some ICTY sentencing judgments have been less accepting of retributive 
rationales.  See Ohlin, supra note 9, at 384 n.56 (surveying ICTY sentencing 
judgments). 
18  See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 605-07 (discussing problems of inter-
State cooperation and state sovereignty which confound the goals of deterrence); 
Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate 
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006) (questioning the value of 
applying deterrence theory in atrocity prevention); Sloane, supra note 3, at 74 
(maintaining that some criminals weigh the costs and benefits in self-interested 
and idiosyncratic ways frustrating the goals of deterrence); David Wippman, 
Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473 
(1999) (denouncing deterrence as “at best plausible but [a] largely untested 
assumption”). 
19  See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2031-32 (1998) (distilling the “goals most frequently 
articulated by the diplomats who established these tribunals and the relevant 
epistemic community of international lawyers,” including these goals: to 
”channel victims’ thirst for revenge toward peaceful dispute resolution, tell the 
truth about what occurred, thereby preserving an accurate historical account of 
barbarism that would help prevent its recurrence, [and] perhaps most 
importantly, restore the lost civility of torn societies to achieve national 
reconciliation”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/2
02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:07 AM 
2014] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 981 
trials are expressive acts broadcasting the news that mass atrocities 
are, in fact, heinous crimes and not merely politics by other 
means.”20 
The distinction between retributive and non-retributive 
rationales is sometimes a source of confusion, and the 
categorization of justifications has been a distinct focus of criminal 
law scholarship, with several important essays dating from the 
1970s and 1980s when criminal theory experienced its well-
documented retributivist revival.21  Michael Moore has provided 
perhaps the most exhaustive catalog, identifying seven different 
views that “are often paraded as retributivist, but in fact are not.”22  
As I outline below, several of these rationales surface in debates 
about ICL. 
2.1. Retributive Justice as Harsh Justice 
Moore first rebuts the misconception that retributivism is 
“identified with a particular measure of punishment such as lex 
talionis, an eye for an eye, or with a kind of punishment such as the 
death penalty.”23  Whereas retributivists are “commonly 
committed to the principle that punishment must be graded in 
proportion to desert . . . they are not committed to any particular 
penalty scheme nor any particular penalty as being deserved.”24 
This distinction is important for contemporary debates about 
ICL sentencing practices, which have focused on the perceived 
                                                     
20  Luban, supra note 10, at 576.  See also Amman, supra note 5, at 118 
(explaining that “[l]aw reflects a society’s values, what it esteems, what it abhors.” 
(footnote omitted)); deGuzman, supra note 2, at 270 (arguing that the Court’s case 
selection should aim primarily to maximize the Court’s expressive impact); 
Sloane, supra note 3, at 83 (“Emphasizing the expressive function of punishment 
in the context of ICL would enable tribunals to begin to address proportionality in 
a non-arbitrary way.”). 
21  See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of Just 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845-46 (2002) (collecting respective references to 
retributivism’s “revival,” “resurgence,” “renaissance,” and “rise” during this 
period). 
22  MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 88 
(1997) (“Retributivism differs from a variety of views that are often paraded as 
retributivist, but that in fact are not.”). 
23  Id.  Lex talionis does figure in Kant’s account of punishment.  IMMANUEL 
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
231-32 (John Ladd ed., 2d ed. 1999) (1797). 
24  Id. 
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leniency of international sentencing.25  For Mark Drumbl, this 
leniency “weakens retribution’s credibility as a penological goal for 
international criminal law.”26  Embracing a similar assumption, 
Jens Ohlin advances a retributivist approach to international 
sentencing which distinguishes between two variants of sentencing 
proportionality, an ordinal proportionality or “defendant-relative” 
concept that assigns higher sentences to more culpable defendants 
and lower sentences to less culpable defendants, and a cardinal 
proportionality or “offence gravity” concept that requires the 
punishment to “match the gravity of the offense.”27  Ohlin notes 
that an over-emphasis on defendant-relative gravity by 
international tribunals will undermine offense-gravity 
proportionality by imposing lenient sentences on serious offenders 
of mass atrocities who happen to have committed marginally less 
grave offenses than other, even more culpable offenders.28 
                                                     
25  See DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 156 (“If retribution truly were to reflect the 
gravity of extraordinary international criminality, death might even fall short”); 
Ohlin, supra note 9, at 373 (“When compared against sentences handed down in 
the United States for regular crimes, the sentences of international criminal 
tribunals are typically far lower, even though the crimes at these tribunals are far 
greater in both moral depravity and legal significance.”); Kevin Jon Heller, A 
Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 118-22 
(summarizing the comparative leniency of ICTY and ICTR sentences for 
international offenses involving murder, torture, and rape to average sentences in 
many countries for murder, torture, and rape). 
26  See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 156 (“In sum: for those who commit the 
most egregious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, 
sanctions tend to range from less severe to as severe as the punishments for 
ordinary murder in many countries.  But extraordinary international crimes are 
supposedly graver than serious ordinary common crimes.  The fact that 
punishment does not match this enhanced gravity weakens retribution credibility 
as a penological goal for international crimes.”). 
27  Ohlin, supra note 9, at 398.  On ordinal versus cardinal proportionality, see 
generally, Andrew Von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 16 
CRIME AND JUSTICE 55, 75-79 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992). 
28  Ohlin, supra note 9, at 399 (arguing that, for serious international crimes, 
“defendant-relative proportionality and offence-gravity proportionality are 
actually at cross purposes, in that fidelity to defendant-relative proportionality 
may lead a court to lower the sentence of a defendant to such a degree that it 
violates the intuitive directives of offence-gravity proportionality.”).  See also 
Koller, supra note 2, at 1026 (“[A]rguments from retribution face further hurdles in 
the context of international criminal law.  As a practical matter, penal sanctions of 
any form are comparatively trivial as retribution for the crimes addressed by 
international criminal law, such as genocide or other instances of mass atrocity.  If 
a domestic court sends the murderer of one person to prison for life or even 
executes him, what punishment is appropriate for the mass murderer of 
thousands?”). 
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There is much in Ohlin’s approach that I agree with, although 
his appeal to offense gravity proportionality begs the question of 
how one determines, in some objective sense, which punishment 
matches any particular offense.  Perhaps Ohlin’s distinction has 
more practical impact if one recharacterizes it in terms of two types 
of ordinal proportionality:  a narrower concept that compares 
defendants only to other defendants appearing before the same 
international criminal tribunal (or maybe to other international 
criminal defendants as a class), and a broader concept that 
compares ICL defendants to the broader class of ordinary criminal 
defendants.29  If, for example, domestic mass murderers are 
generally accorded life sentences, then under the broader 
proportionality framework, it makes no sense, absent other 
intervening considerations, to give an equally or more culpable 
international defendant less than life merely because that 
international defendant has an even guiltier co-defendant. 
If it is indeed the case that a narrow concept of defendant-
relative proportionality has led international tribunals to impose 
sentences that are excessively low in comparison to what a broader 
proportionality metric would require, then a broader 
proportionality concept that looks to domestic practices can inform 
a retributivist critique of international sentencing practice.30  
Although this critique will happen to argue in favor of higher 
                                                     
29  This broader proportionality concept is at the heart of Drumbl’s critique, 
which notes that sanctions for international offenses “tend to range from less 
severe to as severe as the punishments for ordinary murder in many countries,” 
even though “extraordinary international crimes are supposedly graver than 
international offenses.”  See DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 157.  I have elsewhere 
expressed a related concern about treating international offenders as a closed 
universe for purposes of determining sentences.  See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, 
The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1125 n.281 (2011). 
30  Notably, the statutes of several international criminal tribunals expressly 
authorize judges to take account of local sentencing practices.  See Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 23, available at 
http://www.unictr.org (“In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial 
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences 
in the courts of Rwanda.”); Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 24, available at http://www.icty.org (“In 
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to 
the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia.”); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 19, available at 
http://www.sc-sl.org (“In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial 
Chamber shall, as appropriate, have recourse to the practice regarding prison 
sentences in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the national 
courts of Sierra Leone.”). 
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sentences, its underlying logic is agnostic about what sentences are 
appropriate at the domestic level.  There is nothing intrinsic to 
retributive theory that dictates whether, as a general matter, 
sentences should be harsher or more lenient.31  For instance, when 
Anders Behring Breivik received a 21-year sentence for murdering 
77 people, he received the highest sentence permissible under 
Norwegian law.32  A society like Norway may legislate a maximum 
sentence of 21 years for even the worst offenses but rely on 
retributive reasoning when distributing punishments within the 
permitted range. 
It also bears observing that retributive thinking restrains 
utilitarian impulses toward harshness.  U.S. theorists, for instance, 
have invoked retributive theory to decry a variety of practices—
including mandatory minimum sentences, three-strikes-and-your-
out-laws, dangerous offender and sexual predator laws, and the 
punishment of strict liability offenses, on the ground that these 
practices impose suffering not justified by the desert of the 
accused.33  The typical focus of international trials on political 
leaders charged with crimes of great societal impact carries with it 
its own pressures.  For example, interests of social harmony might 
favor the imposition of harsh punishment on a political leader 
widely perceived to have directed mass atrocities, yet retributive 
principles will resist this result to the extent it is not justified by the 
established desert of the accused.34 
                                                     
31  This is not to say that principles of justice do not impose any absolute 
limits on the practice of punishment.  For instance, most would agree it is unjust 
to impose a lengthy prison sentence for a mere speeding violation, and that some 
forms of punishment (for instance, torture) are unjustifiable no matter how 
serious the offense.  Whether such constraints are intrinsic to retributive theory 
itself or instead belong to some other principle of justice is a question outside the 
scope of this Article. 
32  Mark Lewis & Sarah Lyall, Norway Killer Gets the Maximum: 21 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, at A3. 
33  Michael Tonry, Can Twenty-first Century Punishment Policies Be Justified in 
Principle?, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE? 3 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2011). 
34  The international tribunal practice has recognized this restraining feature 
of retributivism.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004), at 
1075 (“[U]nlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint; 
retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and 
nothing more”) (quoting R. v. M. (C.A.) [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, ¶ 80) (emphasis in 
original). 
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2.2. The Utility of Desert 
Another common tendency is to label as retributive approaches 
that promote desert-based punishment for instrumental reasons.  
Yet as Moore elaborates, retributivism is distinct from the views 
that punishment satisfies the thirst for vengeance of victims, or of 
society as a whole; that punishment prevents vengeful victims 
from taking the law into their own hands; and that punishment 
provides the vehicle by which society denounces wrongdoing.35 
This dual use of the retributivist label exists even among 
scholars who acknowledge the operative distinction.  For example, 
a recent article by Andrew K. Woods opens with the statement that 
“[T]he international criminal regime is deeply retributive.”36  Yet 
the remainder of the article makes clear that Woods is not 
concerned at all with retributive justifications for ICL.  In 
describing the ICL regime as retributive, Woods appears primarily 
to mean that this regime is punitive in nature, emphasizes 
incarceration as a response to individual criminal responsibility, 
and gives short shrift to alternative non-punitive or quasi-punitive 
measures.37  The rationale for international criminal justice that 
Woods identifies and critiques is one focused on the “utility of 
desert,” the idea that desert-based punishment serves a positive 
social function by satisfying public demands for retribution.38  As 
Woods acknowledges, this is a utilitarian approach to punishment, 
and he is “solely concerned here with evaluating the claim that the 
regime’s current retributive stance will produce favorable 
consequences.”39  Thus, his analysis focuses exclusively on the 
possible social benefits of different responses to international 
crimes, and gives no attention to what demands, if any, 
retributivism itself rightfully has for ICL.40 
                                                     
35  Id. at 88-90.  See also John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 
116 (1979) (covering similar ground and reaching several of the same conclusions). 
36  Woods, supra note 7, at 634. 
37  Whether Woods is correct even on this point is disputable and depends in 
part on how one defines the “international criminal law regime.”  See infra notes 
200–09 and accompanying text. 
38  See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453 (1996–1997). 
39  Woods, supra note 7, at 634 n.1. 
40  A similar limitation partly underlies Robert Sloane’s analysis of 
retributivism, which he rejects in favor of an expressive theory of international 
sentencing.  See Sloane, supra note 3.  Of the two variants of retributivism he 
identifies, one is a legal-anthropological model and proceeds from the observation 
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Similarly, Ohlin identifies a Rorshach-like quality according to 
which “punishment in international criminal law is at once 
retributivist and consequentialist, but at two different levels.”41  On 
the one hand, there is the “the basic fact that the guilty deserve to 
be punished,” and on the other hand, there is the fact that “the 
victims of various conflicts—say the Kurds in Iraq, the Kosovars in 
Yugoslavia, the Tutsi in Rwanda—may feel that the guilty deserve 
to be punished.”42  This subjective feeling animates a utilitarian 
rationale focused on international peace and security: “the point of 
international criminal tribunals is, in many cases, to convince 
victims to put down their arms and forgo reprisal attacks, and to 
submit their grievances to the rule of law.”43  Nevertheless, 
observes Ohlin, “at the level of the victims, the justification is 
retributive.”44 
Ohlin’s characterization provides a useful reminder that 
different justifications for punishment may operate simultaneously 
for different stakeholders.  Political decision-makers may establish 
an international criminal tribunal as part of a plan to advance 
international peace and security, and others—including victims—
may welcome that decision on purely retributive grounds.  But I do 
not see, as Ohlin would have it, how the convergence of these 
rationales establishes a unique theory of ICL that acknowledges 
“the true and ineluctable retributive nature of the criminal 
process.”45  Instead, the idea that desert-based punishment has 
social utility—common to utility-of-desert approaches at both the 
international and domestic levels—remains a utilitarian rationale, 
albeit one resting on the assumption that ordinary people accept 
retributive theory.  This rationale operates independently from the 
                                                     
that “acts of retaliatory violence, if left unchecked, threaten to destroy the social 
bonds of the community.”  Id. at 78.  Thus, punishment “is the means by which 
the state terminates the otherwise escalating cycles of retaliatory violence within 
its community.”  Id.  As Sloane acknowledges, this theory, “strictly speaking, 
should be regarded as a kind of utilitarianism.”  Id. 
41  Ohlin, supra note 9, at 390. 
42  Id. at 389. 
43  Id.  Indeed, as Ohlin notes, “This dynamic is central to international 
criminal justice, especially since both the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, as 
well as binding ICC referrals from the Security Council, are based on the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII authority to take measures to restore international peace 
and security.”  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. at 392. 
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retributive claim that desert is an intrinsic reason to punish. 
2.3. Selective Punishment 
Some critiques of retributivism at the international level have 
drawn a connection between retributive theory and the regularity 
of punishment.  Diane Amann notes that “[a]s a result of selectivity 
and randomness, just deserts have been meted out inconsistently, 
in very few conflicts, and on only a few defendants,” and argues 
that “[t]hese factors thus have disserved the goal of retribution.”46  
For Mark Drumbl, “the operation of international criminal law 
occasions a retributive shortfall in that too few people or entities 
receive just deserts while many powerful states and organizations 
are absolved of responsibility.”47  As a result,”[t]he retributive 
function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets 
punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for political 
reasons anathema to Kantian deontology.”48  As both authors 
acknowledge, this shortfall has multiple causes and takes different 
forms.  States are often unwilling to prosecute international 
offenses.  When they do, or when international tribunals intervene, 
the overwhelming scope of mass atrocities combined with the 
limited resources and capacity of prosecuting institutions often 
ensures that only a tiny fraction of international criminal offenders 
will face prosecution.49  Decisions to establish international 
criminal tribunals have themselves proceeded on a selective, ad 
hoc basis, reflecting, in Amann’s view, “a random confluence of 
political concerns.”50  Moreover, the case selection of international 
criminal tribunals has consistently faced various accusations—
some more persuasive than others—of political bias.51 
                                                     
46  Amann, supra note 5, at 117. 
47  DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 153. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Amann, supra note 5, at 116. 
51  The post-World War II IMTs focused exclusively on crimes perpetrated by 
members of the Axis powers, leading to accusations of “victor’s justice.”  See, e.g., 
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 
641 (1992) (noting this accusation).  The ICTR has received similar criticism for 
ignoring crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), the 
predecessor of Rwanda’s current government.  See Kenneth Roth, ICTR: Address 
Crimes Committed by RPF, A Letter to the ICTR Prosecutor, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/11/ictr-
address-crimes-committed-rpf  (arguing that “[a] failure to [prosecute RPF crimes] 
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Both Amman and Drumbl invoke this selectivity to support 
non-retributive approaches to ICL.  For Amman, the lesson is that 
international criminal tribunals should pursue expressive goals, 
issuing judgments that are attuned to the complex social meaning 
of criminal justice and that “foster[] acceptance and understanding 
of proscriptive norms.”52  For Drumbl, the retributive shortfall 
provides one of several reasons for international tribunals to defer 
to local solutions, including alternate, non-conventional methods 
of addressing past atrocity.53 
As regards the policy implications of selective punishment, I 
am sympathetic to both arguments,54 but I am less certain that the 
problem of selectivity represents either a failure of retributive 
theory, or some inherent incompatibility between ICL and 
retributivism.  Indeed, the problem of selectivity has most obvious 
relevance for utilitarian approaches to criminal law.55  As both 
authors note, selectivity can undermine the goal of deterrence 
whose efficacy depends on the perceived likelihood of punishment 
for wrongdoing.56  Similarly, under a utility-of-desert rationale, 
                                                     
would taint the perception of the Tribunal’s impartiality in carrying out its 
mandate and thereby undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of future generations”).  
Despite prosecuting offenses committed by all sides to the former Yugoslav 
conflicts, the ICTY has faced accusations of anti-Serb bias among Serbs.  See, e.g., 
Attitudes Towards War Crimes Issues, ICTY and the National Judiciary, Ipsos Strategic 
Marketing, OSCE (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.osce.org/serbia/90422 
(indicating through a public opinion survey, inter alia, that 40% of Serbian 
respondents believe that the primary purpose of the ICTY is “to put the blame for 
war sufferings on Serbs,” that 49% of respondents believe that Serbia should not 
cooperate with the ICTY, that only 16% believe Serbia should cooperate in order 
“to achieve justice,” and that 73% believe the ICTY has a “different attitude 
toward individuals indicted for war crimes depending on their ethnicity”).  The 
ICC, moreover, continues to face accusations of anti-African bias resulting from 
the fact that all its cases and investigations have dealt with crimes committed in 
Africa.  See, e.g., Katrina Manson & Addis Ababa, AU Chief Accuses International 
Criminal Court of Chasing Africans, FIN. TIMES, May 27, 2013. 
52  Amann, supra note 5, at 133. 
53  DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 149, 181. 
54  See generally Greenawalt, supra note 7. 
55  This was a point emphasized by early utilitarian thinker, Cesare Beccaria, 
who argued that the prevailing punishment practices of his day lacked sufficient 
certainty to ensure effective deterrence.  See Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and 
Punishment, in ALESSANDRO MANZONI, THE COLUMN OF INFAMY 11 (Kenlem Foster 
& Jane Grigson trans., 1964) (1764).  See also Noam Wiener, Theories of 
Punishment in the Practice of International Criminal Tribunals 31-34 (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author). 
56  See Amann, supra note 5, at 23 (arguing that “Both [retributive and 
deterrent] objectives depend on enforcement, and for many decades after 
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punishment might fail to quench the public thirst for vengeance if 
provided in insufficient quantity.  Both these considerations can 
provide powerful arguments in favor of expressive strategies or 
alternatives to international criminal prosecution. 
Nevertheless, the implications of a shortfall for retributivism 
itself are less clear.  In the first place, the fact that a great majority 
of the guilty escape punishment, does not by itself clarify which 
rationale guides the punishment of those who are prosecuted.  If 
the guilty are punished because of their desert, then retributivism 
continues to supply a plausible account of international criminal 
justice, at least with respect to those suspects.57 
In addition, as Drumbl acknowledges, selectivity is also a 
pervasive feature of domestic criminal justice.58  The mere fact that 
international justice reflects greater—even substantially greater—59 
selectivity than domestic justice does not ipso facto defeat the 
retributive rationale for punishment, unless one can first establish 
that retributivism imposes some threshold of selectivity beyond 
which it becomes inapplicable.  Moore, for one, has denied that any 
such requirement inheres in retributivism itself, and includes the 
principle of equality in his list of non-retributive ideas.  As he 
observes, the principle of formal justice, dictating that “if we 
punish anyone, we must do so equally,” addresses a different issue 
than does retributivism’s attempt to explain “[w]hy we should 
punish anyone.”60 
                                                     
Nuremberg, the international community did not enforce international criminal 
law.  Although that has changed, contemporary enforcement is limited by two 
factors often lumped together as “selectivity”); Drumbl, supra note 4, at 151 
(“[S]electivity poses a greater challenge to international criminal law than it does 
to national criminal law”) (footnote omitted). 
57  See DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 150 (“Retribution is the dominant stated 
objective for punishment of atrocity perpetrators at the national and international 
levels.”); deGuzman, supra note 2, at 303 (“Even national systems do not punish 
all wrongdoers, but retribution can justify the punishment they do inflict.  In the 
same way, retribution provides some justification for ICC adjudication even if the 
ICC cannot inflict retribution on all those who deserve it and the punishments it 
awards do not always appear satisfactory in terms of proportionality.”). 
58  DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 151. 
59  See deGuzman, supra note 2, at 269 (“Given the massive numbers of cases 
national courts prosecute, only very exceptionally will a selection decision spark 
challenges to the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. . . .  In contrast, 
since the ICC is limited to prosecuting a handful of cases out of thousands of 
potential cases, each selection attracts substantial attention.”). 
60 MOORE, supra note 22, at 90.  Of course, one may be a “retributivist who 
also subscribes to the principle of formal justice.”  Id. 
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None of this is to say, however, that the problem of 
selectivity—in all its guises—is irrelevant to a retributivist’s views 
on ICL.  But the more pertinent question is not whether 
retributivism is compatible with conditions of selectivity, but 
instead how commitments to retributive justice are best reconciled 
with an international criminal justice system that, like all criminal 
justice systems, is necessarily selective.  This is a question that I 
consider in greater detail below, and I argue that there is greater 
flexibility to retributive theory than might be supposed.  Indeed, as 
I shall elaborate, both Amman’s and Drumbl’s specific policy 
prescriptions may be recharacterized as options within a generally 
retributive approach to ICL.  
3. POLITICAL RETRIBUTIVSM 
A different sort of challenge to international criminal 
retributivism has to do with the political theory of international 
justice.  One major variant of retributive theory roots the 
justification of punishment in social contract theory, and thus rests 
on certain presuppositions about the nature of the political 
community that administers criminal justice.  This contractarian 
approach dates to Immanuel Kant—widely considered the father 
of retributive theory—who justified the state’s coercive authority 
as deriving from the moral imperative to punish violations of the 
freedoms guaranteed by the social contract implicitly accepted by 
rights bearing citizens of the state.61  Justifications of this nature 
present a challenge for international criminal tribunals, which are 
creatures of the international community and operate at the 
supranational level, sometimes without the consent of the state 
most closely connected to the crimes in question.  In addition, the 
contexts of mass criminality that typically inspire international 
prosecution tend to rupture the political community in ways not 
accomplished by ordinary domestic crimes. 
Anthony Duff and Robert Sloane have both seized upon these 
                                                     
61  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I 
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (1797) (elaborating 
Kant’s views on punishment).  This, at least, is the theory commonly associated 
with Kant.  Some of his writings indicate a more utilitarian approach to 
punishment.  See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 512–18 (1987) (identifying utilitarian strains in Kant’s writings on 
criminal justice).  For a summary of contractarian approaches to criminal law, see 
GUYORA BINDER, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO US LAW: CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 
2015). 
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unique features of the international regime to question whether 
retributive justifications for ICL can survive the transition from the 
national to the international stage.  Although their arguments 
overlap to some degree they remain distinct and require separate 
consideration. 
3.1. The Political Legitimacy of International Tribunals 
For Duff, the central problem is the lack of legitimacy on the 
part of the international courts that sometimes try ICL offenses.  
He argues that “defendants are answerable to their fellow citizens 
(in whose names the courts act) for public wrongs that they 
commit, in virtue of their shared membership of the political 
community.”62  “The criminal trial,” he continues, “is the forum in 
which we formally call each other to account, as citizens, for such 
wrongs.”63  It is this shared political community that provides a 
theory of jurisdiction, explaining why English courts may 
prosecute English thieves, but why “the theft committed by a 
Polish citizen against a fellow Pole in Poland is not morally, as it is 
not legally, within the jurisdiction of English courts.”64 
The trouble with international criminal trials, on Duff’s 
account, is that the international community is not itself a political 
community that benefits from the same type of shared citizenship, 
and thus it is not clear in many cases that international courts are 
any better situated to conduct trials than is Duff’s hypothetical 
English court that asserts jurisdiction over Polish citizens in 
Poland.  Although Duff observes that an international court like 
the ICC might claim a surrogate role—“acting on behalf of the 
political communities which [national] courts fail to represent as 
they should”—he reasons that this explanation still leaves 
unanswered the question of “by what right can [the ICC] claim to 
act in [the political community’s] name?”65  Duff does 
                                                     
62  Anthony Duff, Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 595 (Samantha Besson & John 
Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
63  Id. 
64  Id.  Notably Duff does not explore the implications of his theory for more 
complex transnational scenarios, such as when a Polish citizen robs an English 
citizen in New York City. 
65  Id. at 599.  Duff also notes a separate problem concerning the possible 
nature of the community on whose behalf the ICC acts: “just when the arguments 
for international jurisdiction seem strongest, there might be doubt about whether 
there exists a political community to which the perpetrator could answer.”  Id.  
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acknowledge that one might answer this question by recognizing 
humanity as a normative community that does not rise to the level 
of a political community, and he indicates that international 
criminal trials ultimately rely on this aspiration.  He then 
concludes somewhat ambiguously by emphasizing that “when we 
think about just what that aspiration involves, we must realize 
how morally demanding it is.”66 
A full assessment of these arguments is beyond the scope of 
this Article and, I believe, unnecessary to its central claims.  For my 
purposes, several points deserve mention.  First, Duff’s challenge is 
a broad one leveled against ICL as a whole, and not merely against 
retributivist accounts of ICL.  Indeed, his account implicitly calls 
into question much broader developments in international law, 
such as the rise of human rights law, which is premised on the idea 
that the international community as a whole has a stake in how 
individual states treat their own citizens, and may legitimately 
demand respect for universal human rights, as well as remedies for 
their breach at both the international and domestic levels.  It also 
calls into question the institutional mechanisms underlying ICL—
such as consent-based treaties and U.N. Security Council 
enforcement—by which states limit their sovereignty more 
broadly.67  If one endorses this broad attack on the international 
                                                     
For instance, “crimes against humanity could surely involve such systematic, 
successful attacks that there really is no basis left on which to identify a political 
community to which their perpetrators ought to answer.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Notwithstanding this observation, Duff appears unwilling to 
conclude that the legal consequence of such a campaign should be freedom from 
prosecution by any court whatsoever and he concludes, without elaboration, that 
“such perpetrators should not escape being called to account.”  Id.  Duff’s 
hesitation on this point raises a broader question about how thick a concept of 
political community his theory requires.  Regardless, the idea that even such 
perpetrators should be prosecuted would seem to cut strongly in favor of 
legitimating international trials that do so, either based on a more expansive 
political retributivism or by appealing to pre-political moral retributivism. 
66  Id. at 604. 
67  The U.N. Security Council established both the ICTY and ICTR pursuant 
to its authority to safeguard international peace and security under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter.  See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) 
(establishing the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
(establishing the ICTR).  The ICC is a treaty-based institution whose jurisdiction is 
limited to crimes committed on the territory of or by a citizen of a state party, the 
only exception being if the U.N. Security Council has acted under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter to refer a situation to the Court.  See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
arts. 12-13 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  So-called hybrid tribunals operate with the 
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legal system, it is no answer to shift from retributive justifications 
to utilitarian ones.  As such, the argument does little to address the 
principal claims of this Article, which presuppose the baseline 
legitimacy of the international legal order, such as it is, and focus 
on the comparative contribution of retributive thinking for ICL as 
opposed to other approaches to punishment.68 
Second, if one accepts—as I and many others do—that a 
sufficient sense of common humanity does permit the international 
community to vindicate certain universal human rights, including, 
in appropriate circumstances, by holding criminal trials of 
individuals accused of specified international offenses, then 
contractarian retributivism will not operate to preclude ICL, 
although it will provide guidance regarding its appropriate reach.  
Adil Haque, for example, has advanced a “relational” theory of 
ICL, focused on cases “[w]hen the state is either a tool of group 
conflict or a passive observer to such conflict,” and it accordingly 
“fails to discharge its role as a neutral source of retributive justice 
with the ability to prevent cycles of group retaliation for past 
violence.”69  This approach relies on precisely the type of claim to a 
common moral community that gives Duff pause.  It embraces the 
“sociological premise” that the post-World War II world is one “in 
which the moral status of individuals is seen to rest not on religion, 
nationality, or other social group membership, but on a common 
humanity,” and, hence, “that just as the state supplanted the clan 
as the foundational moral community, the state has been 
supplanted in turn.”70  Other justifications of ICL track similar 
                                                     
consent of the state to whose territory the tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited.  See 
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
137; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329 
U.N.T.S. 117; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic 
on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
68  If anything, Duff’s critique reinforces my broader claim that a range of 
attitudes about international criminal law are consistent with retributive 
commitments.  A retributivist who accepts Duff’s account of political legitimacy 
will oppose many international criminal trials even in cases where such 
prosecutions are the only feasible means of achieving retribution for grave 
wrongdoing. 
69  Haque, supra note 8, at 296. 
70  Id. at 296-97. 
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lines, emphasizing both a sense of common humanity, and a view 
that international institutions may appropriately intervene in cases 
of structural failure, where states have failed in their primary 
obligation to protect their populations.71 
Third, the implications of Duff’s critique are less clear for 
retributive accounts, such as Michael Moore’s, that emphasize the 
pre-political moral intuition that punishing grave wrongdoing is 
intrinsically the right thing to do.72  Whether pre-political moral 
intuitions of this sort are sufficient to anchor a coherent approach 
to punishment is a disputed matter.73  Nevertheless, the strong 
moral intuition that those who commit mass atrocities should be 
punished is at least arguably a relevant, if not exclusive, factor in 
shoring up the legitimacy of international prosecutorial efforts.  At 
minimum, one can invoke this intuition as evidence that a 
sufficient sense of common humanity does indeed exist to support 
a retributivist model along the lines that Haque has proposed. 
3.2. The Fair Play Model of Contractarian Justice 
Sloane’s critique focuses specifically on Herbert Morris’s “fair 
play” or “benefits and burdens” model of criminal justice, which is 
perhaps the most prominent modern adaptation of Kantian 
punishment theory.74  This contractarian model posits that one 
who violates rules designed to benefit the community acquires an 
unfair advantage: the violator enjoys the benefits protections 
afforded to all subjects of the legal system while also “renouncing 
                                                     
71  For a survey of the literature, see Kai Ambos, Punishment Without a 
Sovereign?  The Ius Puniendi Issue of International Criminal Law: A First Contribution 
Towards a Consistent Theory of International Criminal Law, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
(2013).  Ambos traces this approach back to Kant himself.  See id. at 314 (“A 
supranational ius puniendi can be inferred from a combination of the incipient 
stages of supranationality of a valued-based world order and the concept of a 
world society composed of world citizens whose law—the ‘world citizen law’ 
(Weltbürgerrecht)—is derived from universal, indivisible and interculturally 
recognized human rights predicated upon a Kantian concept of human dignity.”). 
72  See generally MOORE, supra note 22. 
73  See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic 
Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 22 (2012) (“My sense is that these capsule 
summaries, especially with their attending emphases on moral desert, are 
incapable of serving as a persuasive account that could justify state punishment 
from a retributive perspective.”). 
74  Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 4, 475 (1968); 
Sloane, supra note 3, at 80. 
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what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint.”75  The 
purpose of punishment, therefore, is to “[restore] the equilibrium 
of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he 
owes, that is, exacting a debt.”76 
Unlike Duff, Sloane does not question the political legitimacy 
of international criminal tribunals per se, but he argues that the 
types of mass atrocity crimes that typically give rise to 
international criminal prosecutions are themselves a poor fit for the 
fair play model.  He urges that “it would be bizarre to 
conceptualize the génocidaire as a freerider on the hypothetical 
social contract of others not to destroy national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious groups, or to regard a serious human rights abuser as 
arrogating to himself a benefit that others voluntarily relinquished 
in their common interest,”77 and also that “conceptualizing the war 
criminal or génocidaire as a deviant from social norms may make 
little sense where the criminal conduct would be more accurately 
described as conforming to a norm that prevails within the 
criminal’s literal community, be it national, ethnic, racial, or 
martial.”78  Sloane further underlines that the state is often 
complicit in international crimes, and thus does not act as “the 
societal entity ensuring a just distribution of benefits and burdens, 
but on the contrary, as a prime force disrupting that distribution.”79 
Sloane’s critique is a nuanced and targeted one.  His analysis 
does not lead him to reject ICL as a whole, but instead to favor, an 
alternate, expressivist, justification for international criminal 
tribunals.80  His focus on Morris’ particular approach, moreover, 
                                                     
75  Morris, supra note 74, at 478; Sloane, supra note 3, at 80 (quoting Morris).  
Others have endorsed this approach as well.  See generally Wojciech Sadurski, 
Theory of Punishment, Social Justice, and Liberal Neutrality, in PUNISHMENT (Anthony 
Duff ed., 1993); GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1989). 
76  Morris, supra note 74, at 478; Sloane, supra note 3, at 80 (quoting Morris). 
77  Sloane, supra note 3, at 80. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 81. 
80  Indeed, there is some debate about whether the fair play model is in fact 
retributive.  Scholars, such as Michael Moore and John Cottingham, have 
embraced it as such, albeit with some qualification on the latter’s part.  See MOORE, 
supra note 22, at 107 (“It is true that if Morris succeeds he will have shown the 
intrinsic goodness of retribution—that is, that retribution is good in-and-of itself, 
and not because it is instrumental to the attainment of something else that is 
good”) (emphasis in original); Cottingham, supra note 35, at 243, 236 (noting that 
“the immediate focus . . . [of the fair play model] thus centers not on the offender 
but on the law-abiding citizen,” yet maintaining the model is indirectly 
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leaves open the possibility that other variants of retributive theory 
could survive his critique.  Nonetheless, I am not convinced that 
the problems he identifies with the fair play account are unique to 
ICL, or that the conditions he identifies are quite so irreconcilable 
with the model. 
In the first place, one could characterize certain episodes of 
mass atrocity in ways that better fit the theory.  For example, a 
head of state who consolidates political power by directing a 
genocide against a minority population has gained a tangible 
advantage from his crimes that will be counteracted to some 
degree by incarceration.  That the leader has acted with the 
overwhelming support of the non-victim population may not be 
fatal to the theory if one agrees that the leader has violated a norm 
that objectively benefits society (for example, the norm privileging 
a tolerant multi-cultural society over a genocidal homogenous 
society), even if most members of the community, as a subjective 
matter, do not endorse the norm as applied to the particular case in 
question.  Indeed, a portion of the leader’s culpability may lie in 
the very fact that he has injured society by cultivating a climate in 
which genocide has become socially acceptable.  So framed, this 
scenario of social instability can still speak of unfair advantage and 
community harm brought about by the norm violation. 
                                                     
retributivist on the ground that “the means actually chosen for upholding fairness 
is to make the offender ‘pay’ for the unfair advantage,” and further that the fair 
play model has “the best chance of  providing a non-utilitarian rationale for the 
practice of punishment”).  Others, such as Leo Zaibert and George Sher, are not so 
sure.  By depicting punishment as the payment of a debt to society, the fair play 
model mirrors utilitarian approaches by emphasizing the social benefits of 
punishment.  It is in this way difficult to square Morris’s concern for “maintaining 
and restoring a fair distribution of benefits and burdens” with a view that it is the 
desert of the criminal rather than the achievement of social benefits that justifies 
punishment.  Morris, supra note 74, at 483.  Leo Zaibert, PUNISHMENT AND 
RETRIBUTION 119 (2005) (“I find it difficult to accept that Morris’ fair play version 
of retributivism is not, in the final analysis, concerned with consequences, just like 
any form of consequentialism.  Morris after all admits, repeatedly, that the 
justification of punishment is ‘related to maintaining and restoring a fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens [in society].’  But the maintenance of this fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens in society strikes me as a consequence, or a 
‘good end,’ of punishment in precisely the sense that Moore wishes to deny it 
is.”); SHER, supra note 75, at 75 (observing that Morris “construes punishment’s 
aim as controlling behavior” and that the fair play model therefore has “a strongly 
consequentialist element”).  Note also that even John Cottingham, who describes 
the fair play model as indirectly retributivist, is ambivalent in his conclusion, 
observing that “if this approach is to be characterized as ‘retributivist,’ enormous 
caution is needed.”  See Cottingham, supra note 35, at 121. 
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Of course, to adapt the theory in this way requires some 
conceptual choices.  It involves appealing to the objective interests 
of a society that is itself somewhat notional, rather than to the 
subjectively perceived interests of its individual members who 
may no longer consider themselves part of a common society.  This 
adaptation only goes so far.  As Duff observes, “crimes against 
humanity could surely involve such systematic, successful attacks 
that there really is no basis left on which to identify a political 
community,” yet he also concludes that “such perpetrators should 
not escape being called to account.”81 
The more fundamental issue, in my view, is that the fair play 
model is not that compelling to begin with, even without 
considering the special circumstances of ICL.  As J.L. Mackie has 
argued, “The trouble with this approach . . . is that it has little 
relation to most cases of punishment,” because it implies that 
punishment must be proportional to the advantage gained by the 
criminal, rather than to the wrongness of his act.82  As Mackie 
notes, the theory suggests that “if a businessman has secured a 
contract worth $100,000, but has exceeded the speed limit in order 
to get to the relevant appointment on time, he should presumably 
be fined $100,000, whereas a fine of $1 would be enough for 
someone who murders a blind cripple to rob him of $1.”83  On this 
account, the trouble with the fair play approach is that it 
emphasizes “the advantage that may have been gained by the 
criminal in some sort of social competition, whereas the point of 
punishment surely lies not in this but in wrongness of his act and 
the harm that he has done or tried to do.”84  Similarly, a 
retributivist theory of ICL will also do better to focus on the 
wrongness of ICL offenses and to invoke the shared moral status of 
a common humanity as the fundamental justification for the 
                                                     
81  Duff, supra note 62, at 600. 
82  J.L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 680 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991). 
83  Id.  One might counter that Mackie has mischaracterized the relevant 
benefits.  For instance, perhaps the benefit claimed by the driver is merely the 
ability to drive faster (and with greater risk to others) than permitted, whereas the 
murder’s advantage is that the dead victim cannot prevent the theft.  I am grateful 
to Noam Wiener for these examples. 
84  Id.  See also Duff, supra note 62, at 600 (“[A] rapist should be condemned 
and punished not for the social volatility or loss of trust that he caused, nor for the 
unfair advantage that he supposedly took over those who restrain their criminal 
impulses, but for the wrong that he did to the person whom he raped.”). 
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establishment of these offenses and their related international 
institutions. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL RETRIBUTIVISM 
The basic definition I have outlined provides a means of 
distinguishing retributive justifications from consequentialist ones.  
And as I have just described, common criticisms of retributivism in 
the international literature fail to demonstrate why desert based 
reasoning is any less compatible with international prosecutions 
than it is with domestic prosecutions.  Nevertheless, this basic 
account of retributivism also remains incomplete in significant 
ways.  In particular, it does not specify the weight that desert plays 
in punishment decisions.  Does desert justify punishment in the 
minimalist sense of being merely necessary to punishment, or does 
it provide a sufficient, perhaps exclusive reason to punish?  
Depending on how one answers this question, retributivism is 
vulnerable to the critique—far more devastating than the 
objections leveled by international scholars—that the theory is of 
almost no use to decision makers charged with the establishment, 
design, support, and administration of real world justice 
institutions, be it at the domestic or international level.  To obtain a 
more complete picture of how a retributivist might view ICL, one 
must go beyond the accounts of retributivism found in the ICL 
literature. 
This Part examines the international institutional implications 
of five retributivist models.  As the diverse conclusions reached 
under these models reveal, there is no single retributive theory of 
criminal justice institutions, and thus there can be no single 
retributive approach to ICL.  Nevertheless, two basic trends are 
apparent.  First, the understandings of retributivism that are most 
plausible for domestic law are likewise the most plausible for 
international law.  Accordingly, the international setting does not 
pose any unique obstacles for retributive theory.  Second, 
retributivist theory is compatible with a substantially larger range 
of opinion about international criminal justice efforts than might be 
supposed. 
4.1. Minimalism 
I first consider the minimalist version of retributivism, 
according to which blameworthiness is merely a necessary 
condition of punishment.  This type of retributivism has been 
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variously referred to as “weak retributivism,”85 “negative 
retributivism,”86 or “side constrainted”87 retributivism because it 
does not provide an affirmative rationale for punishment.  Instead, 
it merely prohibits the punishment of the innocent, and as a 
corollary, the imposition of punishment beyond what is justified 
by the offender’s desert.  A related, slightly stronger version, 
maintains that wrongdoing permits, but does not demand, 
punishment.88   
The minimalist model’s implications for real world criminal 
justice would appear to be quite limited, because no one seriously 
argues that it is justifiable to deliberately punish the innocent.  
Nevertheless, as I have already noted, the culpability principle 
provides a powerful critique of practices that punish the guilty in 
excess of what they deserve.89 
ICL, by contrast, presents in many ways a more obvious fit for 
retributivist approaches.  Prosecutions focus on especially grave 
instances of violent crimes such as murder, torture, and rape that 
are paradigmatic malum in se offenses.90  There is broad agreement, 
moreover, that convictions and sentences must rest on 
considerations of individual blameworthiness.91  This commitment 
can provoke disagreement in particular contexts.  A major 
challenge for ICL concerns how to assign individual responsibility 
in cases of mass criminality involving varying degrees of 
participation by countless participants.  Particular debate has 
focused on the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise whose outer 
                                                     
85  HLA HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2d ed. 2008). 
86  Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism and the State’s Interest in Punishment, in 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE NOMOS XXVII 159 (Jr. Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1985). 
 87 R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 11 (2003). 
88  See Mackie, supra note 82, at 680. 
89  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
90  For example, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at arts. 5-8. 
91  See, e.g., KAI AMBOS, 1 TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 2011 (2013) (“In general, international criminal 
tribunals have recognized since Nuremberg that criminal responsibility 
presupposes criminal guilt or culpability.”); Prosecutor v. Tadic  , Case No. IT-94-1-
A, Judgment, ¶ 186 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) 
(“The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national 
systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal 
culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in 
which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla 
poena sine culpa).”). 
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reaches, as developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), permit the conviction of relatively 
minor participants in criminal enterprises for the foreseeable 
offenses of others committed outside the common plan.92  There is 
also debate concerning standards for superior responsibility, which 
can hold military commanders responsible for the offenses of 
subordinates that the commander negligently failed to prevent.93  
These debates, however, are more about the reach of the 
culpability principle than about its desirability.  In other words, 
they reflect different understandings of criminal culpability rather 
than a disagreement over whether culpability is necessary to 
punishment. 
These retributive features of ICL only go so far, however.  A 
purely negative retributivism imposes important limitations on the 
criminal justice system, but it does not provide a rationale for 
punishment.  It cannot explain why punishment is ever desirable, 
much less provide practical guidance on far more specific 
questions such as when it is desirable to establish an international 
criminal tribunal and what crimes that tribunal should prosecute.  
Necessarily, the minimalist model relies on non-retributive 
                                                     
92  The ICTY Appeals Chamber first announced this doctrine in the Tadic 
case.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic , Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).  Pursuant to this mode of participation, an 
accused is held criminally responsible for an international crime based on his or 
her participation, with the requisite mens rea, in a common plan among a plurality 
of persons to commit the crime.  See id. ¶¶ 227–28.  Most controversially, the Court 
held that participants in a JCE are also liable for crimes outside the common plan 
committed by other members of the group so long as the commission of the 
offense was foreseeable and the accused knowingly took the risk of its occurrence. 
Id. ¶ 228.  On the controversy surrounding the ICTY’s development of JCE, see 
generally MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY 48–90 (2009); Allison 
Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 75 (2005); Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT’L 
CRIM. L. REV. 167 (2005); Jens David Ohlin, Joint Criminal Confusion, 12 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 406 (2009); Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007); Darryl Robinson, The 
Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008). 
93  See, e.g., Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 493 (2001) (explaining that, while negligence in preventing 
criminal acts of one’s subordinates can invoke superior responsibility, it is unclear 
whether there can be superior liability for the failure to punish); Danner & 
Martinez, supra note 92, at 129 (highlighting the confusion superior responsibility 
causes). 
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reasoning to guide these and other questions. 
Moreover, this is not an account of retributivism that many 
self-professed retributivists embrace as adequate.94  Michael 
Moore, the best-known modern proponent of a maximalist 
retributivism, has rejected the idea that a justification for 
punishment may be constructed on the combination of 
retributivism and utilitarian rationales such as crime prevention.  
“Retributivism has no room for such other reasons,” he argues.95  
That punishment might prevent crime is merely “a happy surplus 
for the retributivist, but no part of the justification for punishing.”96  
On this account, retributivism provides a sufficient, and not merely 
a necessary condition of punishment.97  Moreover, the “moral 
responsibility also gives society the duty to punish,” whereby 
“[r]etributivism . . . is only a theory of justice, such that, if it is true, 
we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is 
achieved.”98 
In the remainder of this Part, I consider the possibilities and 
implications for ICL of a more robust retributivism, one that, 
following along the lines identified by Moore, provides firmer 
guidance in the establishment and administration of justice 
institutions than does the minimalist version of retributivism. 
4.2. A Duty to Punish 
The version of retributivism that Moore himself embraces is 
deontological: it posits an a priori moral duty to punish the 
deserving.  Moore describes this duty as “agent relative” in that it 
                                                     
94  See Cahill, supra note 11, at 826 (“Retributivist literature is rife with 
references to the principle of desert-based punishment as a moral duty and to the 
corresponding claim that the retributive principle does not merely authorize 
punishment but affirmatively calls for its imposition on those who deserve it.”); 
see also id. at 826 nn.33-35 (citing Hegel, Kant, and more recent theorists for this 
view of retributivism); Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving, 26 Noûs 4, 
447-64, 453 n.11 (1992) (“Some philosophers distinguish positive retributivism, 
according to which criminality is sufficient to justify punishment, from negative 
retributivism, according to which criminality is necessary to justify punishment.  
Others define retributivism so that the latter is not a form of retributivism at all.”). 
95  MOORE, supra note 22, at 88-89. 
96  Id. at 89. 
97  See id. at 88 (“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral 
desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her; the principle 
Quinton advocates makes such moral desert merely a necessary condition of 
punishment.”). 
98  Id. at 91. 
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“regards the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded 
on each occasion, considered separately.”99 
What does this duty demand, and how, precisely, does one 
honor the obligation “to set up institutions so that retribution is 
achieved?” 
4.2.1. Absolutism 
Michael Cahill observes that one possible interpretation of this 
duty is absolutist, placing all individual actors in the justice system 
under an obligation to avoid all failures of desert.100  This absolutist 
approach “creates a clear affirmative goal for the application of the 
retributive principle:  punish everybody who deserves it, to the full 
extent of their desert.”101  But the problem, immediately apparent, 
is that the duty imposes an impossible goal.102  Moreover, argues 
Cahill, the absolutist version of retributivism provides no means of 
setting priorities concerning which crimes to punish, because the 
obligation to prosecute a pickpocket is just as absolute as the 
obligation to prosecute a mass murderer.  The result in the real 
world is a “practical fiasco.”103 
Applied to ICL, this fiasco borders on incoherence.  The kind of 
absolutist model that Cahill describes is incapable of setting 
priorities between crimes is likewise incapable of providing the 
sort of jurisdictional theory underlying ICL, which by its nature 
rests on a division of labor between domestic and international 
authority.  If retributivist obligations can be globalized, and do not 
presuppose obligations specific to a particular political community, 
then every state might be obligated to punish all offenses 
committed anywhere in the world.  Perhaps, as Cahill suggests, the 
absolutist model might favor a counterintuitive policy of 
prosecuting those who can be caught and prosecuted most easily, 
                                                     
99  Id. at 156.  See also Cahill, supra note 11, at 826 (“Retributivist literature is 
rife with references to the principle of desert-based punishment as a moral duty 
and to the corresponding claim that the retributive principle does not merely 
authorize punishment but affirmatively calls for its imposition on those who 
deserve it.”). 
100  Cahill, supra note 11, at 826. 
101  Id. at 828. 
102  Id. (“In practice . . . limitations of resources, evidence, and knowledge 
make this goal impossible to achieve.  Even if we wanted to punish every 
wrongdoer or offender, we could not find them all or muster sufficient proof of 
their crimes.”). 
103  Id. at 857. 
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irrespective of the gravity of their offenses.104  In that case, the 
model would disfavor ICL in favor of domestic efforts to punish 
perpetrators of small-scale ordinary offenses. 
This insight is of little consequence, however, because it does 
nothing to defuse the general impracticality of the absolutist model 
at whatever level of government one applies it.  Indeed, this 
absolutist model is not one that has any identifiable champions.  It 
serves instead as a heuristic, one that challenges the coherence of 
retributivism, much in the way that the specter of punishing the 
innocent challenges the adequacy of utilitarian approaches. 
4.2.2. Agent-Relativism 
One response among deontologists to the practical limitations 
of real world justice is to emphasize that the duty to punish is an 
agent-relative one that is only violated by an intentional or 
knowing failure to punish a culpable individual.105  This 
qualification opens up various possibilities whereby certain 
failures to punish are not governed by the duty, and certain 
government functions lie outside the retributive obligation.  For 
example, Moore argues that a judge imposing a sentence is bound 
by retributive duties, but a legislature that diverts funds away 
from the justice system to health care is not.106  Offenders will 
escape justice on account of the legislature’s actions, but the 
legislative decision does not, under this variant, reflect an 
intentional failure to punish the deserving.107  As Cahill explores, 
                                                     
104  Id. at 849.  
[T]he absolutist model’s enforcement scheme would probably 
concentrate its focus on the per-offender cost of apprehension.  The 
severity of the crime in question should not enter the calculus, for in the 
absolutist account, the duty to punish wrongdoing is categorical and 
therefore applies to all offenses, great and small.  Facing constraints on 
its ability to punish all deserving offenders, the model’s second-best 
alternative would be to satisfy the duty to punish in as many cases as 
possible—that is, to maximize the number of deserving offenders 
receiving punishment.  Id. 
105 MOORE, supra note 22, at 158 (“Agent-relative moral norms bind us 
absolutely only with respect to evils we either intend or (on some versions) 
knowingly visit on specified individuals.”). 
106  Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1523, 1552 n.79 (2007). 
107  In Kantian terms, the legislature would at most be subject to an imperfect 
duty to pursue criminal justice, a duty that, like the obligation to help the poor 
and pursue other good ends, is enforceable and does not require the performance 
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versions of deontological punishment theory, including some 
mixed theories of criminal law, also allow for more utilitarian 
thinking on the part of police officers and prosecutors, avoiding 
the logistical fiasco of absolute retributivism.108  These limitations, 
of course, reflect a substantial qualification of Moore’s claims that 
“[r]etributivism has no room for . . . other reasons”109 and that 
society has an “obligation to set up institutions so that retribution 
is achieved.”110 
How might this limited duty translate to the international 
setting?  In the first place, this retributivism does not supply a 
theory of jurisdiction to advocate the establishment of ICL and its 
associated institutions.  If retributivist obligations do not guide 
legislative resource allocations, then the deontologist cannot 
explain why a society should affirmatively choose to expend 
resources on the establishment of special international criminal 
tribunals charged with prosecuting specialized international 
offenses.  The same, of course, might be said of domestic courts, in 
the sense that a legislature might in theory decline to allocate any 
funds whatsoever toward criminal justice.  But this prospect is not 
just a fanciful hypothetical for international criminal tribunals, 
which have not existed for most of human history, and operate 
now as fragile institutions, with limited budgets and limited 
enforcement capability, and with inordinate resources expended 
on the trial of a small handful of offenders. 
The deontological approach offers the most concrete guidance 
to judges who, with institutions already in place, and prosecutorial 
charging decisions already made, are tasked with reaching verdicts 
and imposing sentences.  A retributivist will demand that desert-
based reasoning guide these decisions.  Yet even here, the duty to 
punish is vulnerable to frustration by limitations that are 
legislative in character.  Prosecutions at the ICC, for example, are 
subject to various jurisdictional and admissibility requirements.  
Suspects can only be charged with a limited set of crimes and only 
                                                     
of any specific act.  See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS (1785), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE 
WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT 75 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 2005); Wiener, supra note 55, 
at 180-81. 
108  Cahill, supra note 11, at 836-40. 
109  MOORE, supra note 22, at 88-89. 
110  Id. at 91. 
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under certain circumstances.111  The Preamble to the Rome Statute, 
indicates that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the “most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole.”112  An otherwise admissible case must be dismissed, for 
example, if it lacks “sufficient gravity.”113  Accordingly, ICC judges 
remain under an obligation to dismiss cases that fail these statutory 
criteria even if doing so will allow the suspect to escape justice.  To 
the extent that much or all of legislative decision-making is not 
subject to retributive duties, those establishing the rules ex ante 
may impose legal obligations requiring judges, when confronted 
with particular cases, to commit prima facie violations of their 
retributive duties. 
A starker example presents itself in Rwanda’s efforts to address 
the genocide committed against its Tutsi population in 1994.  Faced 
with many tens of thousands more suspects in pre-trial detention 
than its overburdened court system could possibly try in a manner 
consistent with basic due process protections,114 Rwanda 
established a mandatory plea bargaining scheme according to 
which suspects who confessed became entitled to reduced 
sentences imposed by informal village tribunals known as Gacaca 
                                                     
111  Rome Statute, supra note 67. 
112  Id. at pmbl. 
113  Id. at art. 17. 
114  A 2011 Human Rights Watch Report summarizes the situation as follows:  
Tens of thousands of suspects were arrested after the genocide, often on 
the basis of a single unsubstantiated accusation of participation in the 
genocide.  The number of detainees grew rapidly and quickly 
overwhelmed the prison system. By October 1994, an estimated 58,000 
persons were detained in prison space intended for 12,000, and by 1998, 
the number of prisoners had reached around 130,000.  Extreme 
overcrowding and lack of sanitation, food, and medical care created 
conditions that were universally acknowledged to be inhumane and 
which claimed thousands of lives.  Many persons were held for years 
without charge and without their cases being investigated.   
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA’S 
COMMUNITY-BASED GACACA COURTS (2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover_0.pdf. 
“In December 1996 the government began to prosecute genocide suspects in 
conventional courts.  By early 1998, only 1,292 persons had been judged and 
relatively few people had confessed to their crimes.  The authorities realized that, 
at this rate, it would take decades to prosecute the large number of detainees.”  Id. 
at 13-14.  The report also notes that Rwandan authorities “turned down proposals 
for foreign judges and other legal personnel to work alongside Rwandan judicial 
officials to help speed up the process.”  Id. at 14. 
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courts.115  For many participants, the Gacaca trials resulted in no 
additional jail time beyond that already served in pre-trial 
detention.116 
How should a deontologist assess Rwanda’s response to mass 
atrocity?  A judge who intentionally sentences murderers to terms 
far below that which the legal system generally demands would 
appear to violate her duty to punish.  Yet, if legislative actions 
remain outside the duty, then the Gacaca system provides an 
effective end run around this restraint.  Judges accused of violating 
their duty to punish may blame the legislature for failing to supply 
them with the necessary legal authority.  The legislature, in turn, 
may point to the absence of any duty to act otherwise.  In this way, 
the Gacaca trials proceed without any violation of the agent-relative 
obligation imposed by the deontological model of retributivism. 
One might counter, however, that the Gacaca trials present a 
case where even the legislative action is subject to retributive 
obligations.  This is not, after all, a mere failure to fund.  The 
legislature has instead taken the affirmative measure of creating an 
alternative system of justice, one established ex post in response to 
known crimes committed by a known set of perpetrators.  This 
distinction is plausible, but it rests on an action/inaction 
distinction that has its own difficulties.  The most serious is that it 
fails to provide an attractive explanation of how Rwanda should 
go about addressing the underlying dilemma that inspired its 
unique legislative response to genocide.  The counterintuitive 
implication is that the retributivist will tolerate impunity for the 
vast majority of perpetrators as the best non-duty-violating option.  
The legislature may simply fail to act, maintaining a status-quo in 
which the court system is unable to provide most suspects with 
trials that comport with due process. 
Apart from the question of legislative responsibilities, there 
remains the problem of how the deontological understanding 
guides the actions of other officials, such as investigators and 
prosecutors.  Either they are also exempt from any obligation to 
punish offenders, and free to set enforcement priorities and pursue 
case selection on utilitarian grounds—in which case the retributive 
rationale translates only into a very limited judicial doctrine—or, 
                                                     
115  See id. at 19-20 (summarizing legislative background of Rwanda’s Gacaca 
trials); id. at 73-80 (summarizing sentencing provisions). 
116  See generally Greenawalt, supra note 7, 624-25. 
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retributivism remains subject to the same critique as under the 
absolutist model; namely, that it imposes an impossible duty.117 
4.3. Consequentialist Retributivism 
In addition to defending a deontological retributivism, Moore 
has identified another variant of retributivism that he describes as 
“consequentialist retributivism.”118  Notably, Moore himself does 
not endorse this rationale.  According to Cahill, consequentialist 
retributivism lacks avowed adherents, but it nevertheless “appears 
to accord with the most natural, intuitive response to the problem 
of how retributive justice would or should work in practice.”119  
This variant treats retribution as a good, such that the role of 
the justice system is to maximize the aggregate amount of deserved 
punishment.  According to Moore, this approach remains 
“distinctly retributivist” because it embraces “the view that the 
guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic good.”120  This 
good, therefore, “is not an instrumental good,” such that it views 
deserved punishment as a means to achieve some other goal like 
crime prevention.  As presented by Moore, consequentialist 
retributivism is entirely distinct from deontological retributivism.  
Nevertheless one might attempt to integrate the two approaches by 
deploying consequentialist retributivism as a mechanism for 
setting priorities among competing punishment obligations.121 
Either way, Moore does not elaborate on the working of this 
approach in much detail, but he does provide some clues when he 
explains how consequentialist retributivism resolves two problems 
often leveled against deontological retributivism.  First, it answers 
the critique advanced by David Dolinko (unfounded, in Moore’s 
view) that a deontological retributivist is unable to support actual 
institutions of punishment which, by their nature, will sometimes 
make mistakes and punish the innocent.122  A consequentialist 
                                                     
117  Cahill, supra note 11, at 836. 
118  MOORE, supra note 22, at 157-58. 
119  Cahill, supra note 11, at 861. 
120  MOORE, supra note 22, at 157. 
121  For instance, Noam Wiener arrives at a similar result as consequentialist 
retributivism in arguing that “prosecutorial discretion ought to be applied from a 
deontological perspective, which regards the gravity of the crimes perpetrated 
and the responsibility of the perpetrator as the prime criteria for case selection.”  
Wiener, supra note 55, at 89. 
122  David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 
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retributivist, according to Moore, “need not maximize the 
punishment of the guilty to the exclusion of other, equally valuable 
states of affairs, such as the non-punishment of the innocent.  Such 
a retributivist may easily maximize both that those deserving 
punishment receive it and that those not deserving of punishment 
not receive it.”123  Second, the consequentialist is able to justify 
decisions (which Moore sees as more problematic for deontologists 
like himself) to “refuse to punish some guilty persons in order to 
be able to punish other, more seriously guilty persons.”124  The 
consequentialist retributivist can accommodate such decisions 
because “no matter how good it is that the guilty receive their 
deserts, more of that good is to be preferred to less of it.”125 
The consequentialist retributivist, in sum, has two building 
blocks at her disposal with which to accommodate the real-world 
constraints that accompany actual institutions of criminal justice.  
She may balance retributive goods against other intrinsic goods, 
and she may set priorities to maximize retributive justice, even 
when doing so involves an intentional refusal to punish someone 
who is deserving.  As is readily apparent, these building blocks 
have significant purchase for institutional decision-making.  They 
allow us to make sense of strategies such as plea-bargaining, and of 
decisions to grant witnesses immunity in exchange for testimony 
against their co-conspirators.  They provide an agenda for 
legislative priorities and prosecutorial discretion that favors the 
prosecution of more serious offenses over less serious ones, and 
that, all else being equal, privileges the disbursement of justice to 
greater numbers of offenders rather than to fewer numbers.  
Finally, they allow actors in the justice system to take cognizance of 
(at least some) goods other than retributive justice. 
Consequentialist retributivism also has substantial purchase as 
a theory of ICL.  I will sketch out this theory in three parts.  First I 
consider the implications of consequentialist retributivism for ICL 
under the (admittedly artificial) assumption that retribution is the 
only relevant good to be maximized.  I argue that even under this 
highly constrained assumption, consequentialist retributivism has 
significant normative and explanatory power as a theory of 
                                                     
(1992). 
123  MOORE, supra note 22, at 157. 
124  Id. at 156. 
125  Id. at 157. 
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substantive international criminal institutions.  Second, and 
perhaps counter-intuitively, I argue that even this artificially 
focused version of the theory fails to provide a conclusive 
justification for the establishment of international criminal 
tribunals or to resolve debates regarding the justifiability of 
amnesties or other alternatives to conventional prosecutions.  
Third, I consider how the model is both enhanced and complicated 
by the embrace of other, non-retributive goods. 
4.3.1. ICL and Maximizing Retribution 
An initial problem in developing a retributive account of ICL is 
that the normative theory of ICL addresses different questions than 
those typically asked by retributive theorists.  As a prima facie 
matter, retributivism’s claim that desert justifies punishment does 
not provide answers to the types of institutional and jurisdictional 
questions central to ICL.  The consequentialist retributivist, 
however, has recourse to an institutional theory dictating that 
instruments of justice should be organized so as to maximize 
retribution in the aggregate.  Accordingly, the promulgation of 
international criminal laws and the establishment of international 
criminal tribunals are desirable when these measures will 
maximize aggregate retribution in ways better achievable than 
through other measures. 
This basic proposition resonates with standard accounts of ICL 
as a law focused on crimes that are extraordinarily grave and are 
uniquely resistant to redress through conventional processes of 
state punishment.126  At the level of substantive law, this view of 
ICL reveals itself most clearly in the definition of crimes against 
humanity, which has evolved to prohibit certain grave offenses 
committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack against 
                                                     
126  For approaches to international criminal law or specific international 
crimes that incorporate these elements in one form or another, see, e.g., LARRY 
MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 63-79 (2004); WERLE, supra note 10, at 94 (noting 
that crimes prosecuted by international tribunals reflect a “context of organized 
violence”); Haque, supra note 8.  Elsewhere, I have elaborated on an “enforcement 
theory” of ICL according to which “ICL is concerned with offenses whose very 
commission is associated with failures of domestic sovereignty, either because of 
state inability to prosecute or because of illegitimate state reluctance to prosecute. 
The very commission of an ICL offense, therefore, justifies heightened concerns 
that the standard bases of domestic jurisdiction are inadequate and that additional 
international bases of jurisdiction are appropriate.”  Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 
1096. 
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any civilian population.”127  These are the types of mass atrocities 
that are resistant to domestic enforcement because they are 
typically committed either with the collusion of a state, or under 
circumstances rendering the state unable to effectively bring the 
perpetrators to justice.  International prosecutions of genocide and 
war crimes—the other “core” international offenses most 
frequently prosecuted at the international level—also typically 
involve contexts of systemic criminality.128 
At the procedural level, one sees a similar concept in operation 
in the admissibility requirements of the ICC, which impose both a 
standalone gravity requirement for all prosecutable offenses, and a 
complementarity requirement, mandating deference to domestic 
courts when a state with jurisdiction is genuinely investigating or 
prosecuting a particular case.129 
The consequentialist retributivist can explain this aspect of ICL 
in terms of a division of labor between domestic and international 
courts.  For many reasons, domestic courts are better suited to 
prosecute most crimes.  This is true as an economic matter, it is 
true as a logistical matter, and, given the democratic deficit 
inherent in international institutions,130 it is true as a matter of 
comparative political legitimacy.  In special cases, however, the 
domestic court system will predictably prove inadequate, and ICL 
can help bring retributive justice that is otherwise unachievable. 
                                                     
127  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 7. 
128  The definition of genocide does not explicitly require collective or 
systematic criminality, but the crime’s focus on preventing the destruction of 
entire groups necessarily associates the crime with collective criminality.  See, e.g., 
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 440 (2007) (noting that a single person 
“would rarely be capable of destroying an entire group, or even a significant part 
of a group,” and querying whether “such an individual [should] still be found 
guilty of genocide, even where his intended outcome was impossible to achieve”).  
War crimes take place in the context of collective violence represented by a state 
of armed conflict.  Although they need not be systematic, the Rome Statute 
reflects the international prosecutorial trend when it claims jurisdiction over war 
crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes.”  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 8(1). 
129  See Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 17.  Although complementarity as 
a formal legal requirement is unique to the statute of the ICC, the principle 
remains relevant to other institutional contexts.  For example, the UN Security 
Council is unlikely to establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, as it did 
with the ICTY and the ICTR, if it believes that a domestic court is equally up to 
the task.  In these contexts, the complementarity principle implicitly guides the 
exercise of the Council’s political discretion. 
130  See supra Part 3. 
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ICL can have this effect in multiple ways.  It establishes a 
supra-national criminal prohibition that negates the legal effect of a 
state’s efforts to exonerate the guilty.  A crime’s international status 
has the additional consequence of permitting prosecution by a 
specialized international criminal tribunal, or by a domestic court 
that, while lacking a traditional basis of criminal jurisdiction over 
the offense, recognizes universal jurisdiction over a limited set of 
international offenses.131 
For the consequentialist retributivist, ICL’s focus on especially 
grave offenses further reflects the limited capacity of international 
courts to provide an effective substitute for domestic justice.  Given 
the extraordinary expense and effort involved in establishing and 
maintaining specialized international tribunals, and the at-best 
limited willingness of states to fund and support such efforts, 
international prosecutions are rightly focused on only the most 
egregious offenses whose prosecution will produce the largest 
quantum of retributive justice. 
Yet, even for these gravest offenses, the most successful 
international tribunals have succeeded at prosecuting only a tiny 
fraction of the guilty. Because the quantum of retribution achieved 
matters to the consequentialist retributivist, this justification of ICL 
is vulnerable to a critique about selectivity along the lines 
advanced by Amann and Drumbl.132  Under this version of the 
critique, the problem is not that retributivism is inherently 
incompatible with selective punishment, but that the resources and 
energy devoted to international prosecutions would be better 
diverted to other retributive projects—such as the prosecution of 
ordinary crimes in domestic courts.  In this way, consequential 
retributivist thinking can supply an argument against ICL. 
On the other hand, as sketched by Moore, the consequentialist 
retributivist is concerned not with the number of perpetrators 
convicted per se, but with the aggregate amount of justice 
dispensed:  the model justifies letting lesser offenders go free in 
order to secure the conviction of more serious offenders.133  The 
conviction of a genocidal mastermind, therefore, should count 
more than the conviction of an ordinary murderer. Such 
                                                     
131  See generally UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen Macedo ed., 
2004). 
132  See supra Part 2.3. 
133  See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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comparisons are necessarily rough, but surely it is relevant, for 
example, that the tiny country of Rwanda lost several times more 
lives to murder during the few months of the state-orchestrated 
1994 genocide than the United States has lost to murder during the 
last several decades.134  A situation like Rwanda’s arguably justifies 
the commitment of substantial resources to target a small, but 
highly culpable fraction of the accused; for example, the senior 
leadership. 
The consequentialist retributivist model can also factor in the 
potential of international tribunals to facilitate retributive justice at 
the domestic level.  For instance, international criminal trials may 
serve as instruments of transitional justice, supporting an ongoing 
political transition in a post-conflict society towards rule-of-law 
values that will facilitate domestic prosecutions.  Under the right 
circumstances, an international trial might do so in a very concrete 
manner by incapacitating culpable political leaders who pose a 
threat to the transition.135  Consequentialist retributivism also has 
the ability to incorporate expressive accounts according to which 
international trials promote norm internalization both in specially 
affected societies and on a global level.136  Although there are many 
non-retributive benefits associated with a post-conflict state 
undertaking a successful transition to a more stable society, and 
with promoting global respect for the rule of law, these 
achievements also contribute to the consequentialist retributivist 
calculus to the extent that norm internalization facilitates domestic 
efforts to achieve retributive justice. 
4.3.2. The Challenge of Alternative Justice 
Consequentialist retributivism, as I have described it, provides 
a vocabulary for defending a system of ICL, one focused on the 
prosecution of especially grave offenses that are resistant to 
                                                     
134  Estimates of the number killed in Rwanda in 1994 range from 800,000 to 
one million.  The U.S. Department of Justice reports that “[t]he number of 
homicides reached an all-time high of 24,703 homicides in 1991 then fell rapidly to 
15,522 homicides by 1999,” after which “the number of homicides remained 
relatively constant.”  Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Homicide Trends in the United 
States, 1980–2008, Annual Rates for 2009 and 2010, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 2011), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. 
135 For an argument along these lines in the context of the former Yugoslavia, 
see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Milosevic and the Justice of Peace, in THE MILOSEVIC 
TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY (Timothy William Waters ed., 2013). 
136  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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prosecution through the standard exercise of domestic jurisdiction.  
Perhaps, counter-intuitively, it is also compatible with other 
responses to mass atrocity, ones sometimes seen to conflict with 
the ambitions of ICL. 
I have already mentioned the example of Rwanda’s Gacaca 
trials, which offered greatly reduced sentences—often no more 
than community service—to those who confessed to participation 
in the genocide.137  One can defend this arrangement on non-
retributive grounds, for example by arguing that alternate justice 
mechanisms such as these are better calibrated to promote 
reconciliation and social stability in the wake of mass atrocities 
than are conventional trials.138  But accounts of the Gacaca trials 
commonly track consequentialist retributivist lines:  although they 
provided a diminished form of retribution, the Gacaca proceedings 
nevertheless ensured a greater quantum of retributive justice for a 
larger class of offenders than would otherwise have been possible 
given the infeasibility of providing every suspect with a full and 
fair trial in Rwanda’s beleaguered court system.139 
In Rwanda, at least, these alternative proceedings took place in 
parallel with more conventional prosecutions, reflecting a tiered 
approach according to which the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the Rwandan courts prosecuted a select 
group of high-level offenders, and the Gacaca trials processed a 
                                                     
137  See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
138  See Report on the Reflection Meetings Held in the Office of the President of the 
Republic from May 1998 to March 1999, GOV’T RWANDA, 55-56 (1999), 
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4907/2378.pdf?seque
nce=1 (summarizing discussions of Rwandan government commission and 
reporting, inter alia, arguments in favor of Gacaca courts to address Rwanda’s 
genocide on the grounds that: “The new Gacaca . . . would . . . give the power to 
the people,” that “new justice can reestablish the unity of Rwandans based on 
everybody’s participation,” that “[t]he new Gacaca will also help Rwandans to 
believe and even actively participate in justice,” and that “[t]he people are not 
considering Government justice as theirs”). 
139  See, e.g., Shannon E. Powers, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for 
International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice, 15 ASIL INSIGHTS 17 (June 23, 
2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/ volume/15/issue/17/rwanda’s-
gacaca-courts-implications-international-criminal-law-and (“Retributive justice 
emphasizes holding individuals accountable for their actions through 
commensurate punishment.  On the one hand, Gacaca has been credited with the 
swift delivery of results that could not possibly have been achieved by the ICTR 
or the national courts.  This is significant because overcrowding in Rwandan 
prisons had rendered conditions intolerable, and delayed trials also raise 
significant human rights concerns.  Tellingly, despite criticisms of the Gacaca, 
virtually no feasible alternatives have been suggested.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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larger group of mostly lower-level suspects.140 Consequentialist 
retributive rationales are also available to even less traditional 
approaches, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(“TRC”) by which South Africa offered individualized amnesties to 
perpetrators of apartheid-era political crimes who offered full, 
public confessions of their wrongdoing.141 
In defending the TRC’s work from charges that it encouraged 
impunity, the Commission’s chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
characterized the amnesty process in part in punitive terms: 
The amnesty applicant has to admit responsibility for the 
act for which amnesty is being sought, thus dealing with 
the matter of impunity. Furthermore, apart from the most 
exceptional circumstances, the application is dealt with in a 
public hearing. The applicant must therefore make his 
admissions in the full glare of publicity. Let us imagine 
what this means. Often this is the first time that an 
applicant’s family and community learn that an apparently 
decent man was, for instance, a callous torturer or a 
member of a ruthless death squad that assassinated many 
opponents of the previous regime. There is, therefore, a 
price to be paid. Public disclosure results in public 
shaming, and sometimes a marriage may be a sad casualty 
as well.142 
Dan Markel has advanced a deontological understanding of 
retributivism that he claims is satisfied by South Africa’s 
individualized amnesty.143  According to this “confrontational” 
retributivism, the state satisfies its moral duty “by ensuring a 
connection ‘designed to bring home to the offender the nature of 
                                                     
140  For a summary of ICTR judgments, see American University Washington 
College of Law War Crimes Research Office, ICTR Judgment Summaries, 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/ictr_judgements.cfm.  Rwandan law 
provides that the most serious “category 1” offenders are subject to the most 
severe penalties.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED, supra note 114, 
at 18.  These cases were originally tried in the regular Rwandan court system.  Id. 
at 18-19.  In 2008, the Rwanda Parliament passed a law transferring all but the 
highest-level category 1 suspects to the Gacaca courts.  Id. at 112-13. 
141  See generally THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, VOL. 1 (1998) [hereinafter 
TRC FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/. 
142  Id. at 8-9. 
143  Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards A Theory of Retributivism in 
Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 398 (1999). 
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his criminal act,’” and in which, so long as it acts impartially, “[t]he 
state . . . can determine how that connection is made.”144 
Markel defends the TRC process as a proportional response to 
wrongdoing that, in recovering states like South Africa, can fully 
satisfy a state’s retributive obligations.145 Consequentialist 
retributivism, by contrast, permits a defense of individualized 
amnesty as an insufficiently proportionate, compromised form of 
justice that nevertheless represents a reasonable effort to maximize 
retribution in imperfect conditions.146  South Africa’s experience 
provides at least two building blocks for this argument, both 
highlighted by Tutu.  First, the prosecution of apartheid-era crimes 
was only possible as the result of a negotiated settlement that 
conditioned the political transition on an amnesty deal.  According 
to Tutu, “[t]here is no doubt that members of the security 
establishment would have scuppered the negotiated settlement 
had they thought they were going to run the gauntlet of trials for 
their involvement in past violations for a political transition.”147  
                                                     
144  Id. at 432. 
145  Id. at 434 (arguing that “proportionality must be understood, not strictly 
with reference to the gravity of the crime instigating the encounter with the state, 
but rather, to the confidence that the state has in knowing the perpetrator’s 
recognition of his defeat, which implies the knowledge of the wrongfulness of his 
unrestrained will”).  Id. at 436-40 (arguing that the TRC’s amnesty procedures are 
consistent with the author’s account of retribution). 
146  Wiener argues that amnesties are impermissible because they treat people 
as means to an end rather than as ends in and of themselves, thereby violating 
Kant’s categorical imperative.  See Weiner, supra note 55, at 178.  This argument 
indicates a possible limit to my suggestion that consequential retributivism can 
also supply criteria for choosing among competing deontological obligations.  See 
supra note 121 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, it is not clear to me that this 
conclusion about amnesties necessarily flows from Kantian deontology.  Although 
amnesties can serve social purposes, a decision simply to leave a suspect at liberty 
does not affirmatively use someone in the way that society does, for example, 
when it incarcerates a perpetrator in order to promote deterrence.  Likewise, even 
if de jure amnesties themselves violate moral duties, one might still distinguish 
simple exercises of prosecutorial discretion, such as when an international 
prosecutor declines to press charges against a suspect who has benefitted from a 
domestic amnesty, from actions that affirmatively shield a suspect from 
prosecution, such as when an international court declares a domestic amnesty to 
be valid and legally binding. 
147  TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, ¶ 22.  Admittedly, this argument is 
somewhat vulnerable to the critique that it appeals to the non-retributive value of 
war avoidance, as South Africa could have endured a civil war without making 
any commitment to amnesty.  A consequentialist retributivist may counter, 
however, that in that circumstance, the chance of achieving any retribution would 
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Second, and as with Rwanda some years later, the “country simply 
could not afford the resources in time, money and personnel” 
involved in conventional prosecutions, and “the route of trials 
would have stretched an already hard-pressed judicial system 
beyond reasonable limits.”148  Whether or not one accepts the 
factual predicates of these arguments in the particular case of 
South Africa, these are precisely the types of arguments that would 
lead a consequentialist retributivist, given the right set of 
circumstances, to endorse particularized amnesty as the means best 
suited to achieve the maximum retributive justice feasible.  
Unlike the deontological model, moreover, consequentialist 
retributivism supplies no definitive stopping point to this 
reasoning.  For example, even a general amnesty measure—one 
that exempts a class of individuals from prosecution without 
providing individualized hearings and determinations—could still 
be said to provide a measure of retributive justice to the extent it is 
accompanied by official statements condemning the wrongdoers as 
a class, and perhaps also by factual findings that identify some 
individual offenders.  Measures like these may fail Markel’s 
deontological account,149 but a consequentialist retributivist could 
still defend this diluted justice as the best achievable under the 
circumstances.  Indeed, a consequential retributivist could endorse 
complete impunity on the ground that resources and efforts are 
best preserved for other offenders whose prosecution does not face 
these obstacles. 
4.3.3. Consequentialist Retributivism and Other Values 
Thus far, my exploration of consequentialist retributivism has 
focused on only one value, that of maximizing retributive justice.  
Even within this narrow framework, I have argued that this 
retributivism can justify a surprising variety of responses to serious 
international offenses.  It supplies a framework for understanding 
                                                     
have been far less certain. 
148  TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 5. 
149  See Markel, supra note 73, at 441 (arguing that the confrontational account 
“affirmatively rules out any attempt to leave room for ‘political mercy’ in the form 
of a blanket amnesty in recovering states, or otherwise”).  Markel does allow, 
however, that cases of supreme emergency can override retributive obligations.  
Id. at 25 (noting “the challenges to retributive punishment in cases of supreme 
emergency” and stating that “we need to consider more seriously how to identify 
instances of emergency, such that even the confrontational conception of 
retributive justice really should lose to threats to social peace”). 
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and justifying ICL, but it also supplies a vocabulary for those who 
argue, in particular cases, that conventional prosecutions should be 
set aside for the more lenient treatment provided by various forms 
of alternative justice, such as Rwanda’s Gacaca trials and South 
Africa’s TRC. 
Of course, the assumption that retributive justice is the only 
operative value is an artificial one, as it ignores the other priorities, 
such as funding health care and providing for a national defense, 
that must compete with criminal justice for resources.  
Consequentialist retributivism, according to Moore, can 
acknowledge non-retributive values, and it “need not maximize 
the punishment of the guilty to the exclusion of other, equally 
valuable states of affairs.”150  Moore, however, devotes little 
attention to identifying these states of affairs or explaining how 
they interact with retributive values. 
Perhaps the easiest case is when non-retributive goals 
complement retributive goals.  In establishing the TRC, argues 
Tutu, South Africa did more than supply a measure of 
punishment:  “Had the miracle of the negotiated settlement not 
occurred,” he argues,  “we would have been overwhelmed by the 
bloodbath that virtually everyone predicted as the inevitable 
ending for South Africa.”151  The TRC also aspired to promote 
future reconciliation through “restorative justice which is 
concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting 
imbalances, restoring broken relationships—with healing, 
harmony and reconciliation.”152  If South Africa can avoid 
bloodshed and promote future harmony with a particular 
institutional response to wrongdoing, then it should choose that 
response over other responses that do not promote these or 
comparable goals, at least to the extent that no aggregate loss of 
retributive justice is entailed.  In some contexts, such as when the 
U.N. Security Council invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to 
establish an international criminal tribunal or refer a situation to 
the ICC, the advancement of non-retributive goals is a de jure 
requirement.153 
                                                     
150  MOORE, supra note 22, at 157. 
151  TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 5. 
152  TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 9 (noting also that “amnesty cannot 
be viewed as justice if we think of justice only as retributive and punitive in 
nature”). 
153  Ohlin, supra note 9, at 391 (arguing that certain consequentialist dynamics 
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The more difficult question is how to resolve conflicts between 
retributive justice and other values.  Moore expressly contemplates 
that consequentialist retributivism will sometimes favor non-
retributive values over retributive values.  He mentions, in 
particular, the value of not prosecuting the innocent.154  Beyond 
that, little is clear.  One problem concerns the types of values that 
belong in the calculus.  The non-prosecution of the innocent, at 
least, is a value particular to criminal justice, one that has a similar 
moral and formal quality to the value of punishing the guilty.  But 
there is no obvious reason why the consequentialist retributivist 
should not open the doors to any number of non-retributive goods, 
such as the desire to prevent crime, avoid bloodshed, and promote 
societal reconciliation.  For a legislature that must set priorities and 
allocate scarce resources, consideration of values such as these is 
unavoidable.155 
The second problem concerns the weight of competing values.  
When Moore contemplates balancing deserved punishment 
against, “other, equally valuable states of affairs,” the value he 
mentions—that of protecting the innocent—is one generally ranked 
higher than punishing the guilty.156  That is evident, for example, in 
the fact that many legal systems require the establishment of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than applying, say, a “more 
probable than not” standard.157  Once values such as peace-
                                                     
are “central to international criminal justice, especially since both the creation of 
the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as binding ICC referrals from the Security Council, 
are based on the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority to take measures to 
restore international peace and security.  In this manner, then, criminal law 
intersects with international law, insofar as the criminal justice system for 
individuals is used as a way to help promote international peace and collective 
security.”). 
154  MOORE, supra note 22, at 157. 
155  The international context also raises special problems regarding the 
attachments that bind particular political communities.  One can agree, for 
example, that ICL is legitimated by the moral community of humanity as a whole, 
while nevertheless accepting that political communities owe special obligations to 
their own members that privilege the pursuit of local justice over global justice. 
156  MOORE, supra note 22, at 157. 
157  See, e.g., In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (“The requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for 
cogent reasons.  The accused, during a criminal prosecution, has at stake interest 
of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his 
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized 
by the conviction.  Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom 
of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when 
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making, social reconciliation, and crime prevention come into the 
picture as independent values that may be weighed alongside 
retributive goals, consequentialist retributivism becomes 
vulnerable to the critique that is not much of a retributivism at all, 
as it provides decision-makers with a menu of non-retributive 
values from which to draw, and does so without providing any 
guidance for resolving conflicts between these values. 
4.4. Threshold Retributivism 
Moore himself endorses a different way of explaining why one 
should “refuse to punish some guilty persons in order to be able to 
punish other, more seriously guilty persons.”158  His “threshold 
deontology” maintains that there are limits to the weight of 
retributivist obligations, and thus that violations of agent-relative 
moral duties are permissible when necessary to prevent 
“extraordinary harms.”159  Moore elaborates that “[a]s the 
consequences get more and more severe, the consequentialist 
principle becomes of greater weight as applied to this situation, 
until at some point (the threshold) the consequentialist principle 
outweighs competing principles of morality.”160  Prior to reaching 
the threshold, consequences determine the rightness of actions 
only so long as no violations of moral duties are involved.  After 
the threshold is passed, however—an event that Moore analogizes 
to water spilling over a dam161—the avoidance of negative 
consequences can justify violating moral duties. 
Moore’s best-known articulation of this concept involves 
torture, which he argues may be justified against terrorists when 
necessary to obtain “sufficiently good consequences,” and against 
the innocent only to avoid “the most horrendous of 
consequences.”162  However, he also applies this approach to 
punishment, explaining that one should forego the punishment of 
                                                     
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”).  See also id. at 372 (“I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed 
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict 
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”) (Harlan, J. concurring). 
158  MOORE, supra note 22, at 156. 
159  Id. at 719. 
160  Id. at 723. 
161  Id. (“An analogy may help here: imagine water slowly rising behind a 
dam until it eventually spills over.”). 
162  Id. at 724. 
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a less serious offender when necessary to “punish some very 
deserving criminal(s).”163 
How does this approach play out in the context of ICL?  One 
might argue that the high-stakes contexts of transitional justice 
often accompanying international prosecutions dictate that all or 
most of ICL lies beyond the threshold.  If so, threshold deontology 
does not provide a theory of how retributivism may be 
operationalized at the international level so much as a theory of 
why retributivism is irrelevant to ICL.  After all, the future well-
being of a society devastated by mass atrocities—and at risk, 
perhaps, to be so devastated again—is a matter of such importance 
that retributive values would seem to pale in comparison.  
Accordingly, one could argue that decisions about whether and 
how to pursue international criminal justice should be guided 
entirely by utilitarian considerations. 
The picture is not quite so straightforward, however.  Although 
Moore’s analogy to a dam overflowing seems to suggest a dramatic 
divide between pre- and post-threshold thinking, the division 
appears to apply on a decision-by-decision basis.  To take Moore’s 
example of society foregoing the prosecution of one offender in 
order to secure the conviction of a much more culpable offender,164 
threshold deontology in this instance operates only to justify the 
particular choice between offenders.  Absent other overriding 
considerations, the example does not suggest that the actual 
prosecution of the higher level offender should itself deviate from 
retributive principles, for example when it comes to sentencing.  So 
too, at the international level, a threshold deontologist will 
presumably continue to advocate as much retributive justice as is 
feasible under circumstances that require some deviation from 
retributive obligations. 
If so, threshold deontology ends up at a similar place as 
consequentialist retributivism, with retributive and non-retributive 
considerations operating together, and it shares a similar 
adaptability and indeterminacy.165  The primary distinction is that 
in providing an exception to deontological obligations, it does 
nothing to address the more general problem concerning which 
                                                     
163  Id. at 158. 
164  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
165  This will be particularly true if, as seems logical, consequentialist 
retributivism is itself one of the principles that comes into play once the threshold 
has been passed. 
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types of decisions are bound by the duty to punish in the first 
place.  As such, it is not obvious that threshold deontology speaks 
to as broad a range of institutional decisions—including whether to 
establish international tribunals in the first instance—as does 
consequentialist retributivism. 
Moore’s threshold deontology has also drawn criticism for 
imposing an arbitrary line of demarcation.166  If important non-
retributive considerations can justifiably inform punishment 
decisions, why must they wait until the threshold has passed?  
Moreover, Moore may be wrong in his apparent assumption that 
the threshold he identifies is met only in extraordinary situations.  
As Douglas Husak has observed, “it is inevitable that the practice 
of punishment will suffer from (at least) each of the following three 
deficiencies:  It will be tremendously expensive, subject to grave 
error, and susceptible to enormous abuse.”167  Given that “the 
drawbacks of punishment can be described as outweighing the 
value of punishing the deserving,”168 the very establishment of a 
criminal justice system arguably presents the kind of extraordinary 
harm that, under Moore’s view, requires resort to non-retributive 
justifications.169 
5. RETRIBUTIVISM AS A GOOD REASON TO PUNISH INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES 
As I have just explored, different understandings of 
retributivism converge upon certain common implications for the 
implementation of criminal justice.  Retributivism imposes 
important negative constraints on the administration of criminal 
justice, and can guide the criminal law in other ways, but it cannot 
provide a complete theory of punishment, as some accommodation 
of other values is necessary for retributivism to survive in the real 
world.  The most that retributivism can do is supply a powerful, 
non-exclusive, reason to punish, one that must be weighed 
alongside other reasons favoring and disfavoring punishment.  
These other reasons include the demands of liberal values (such as 
                                                     
166  Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 
905-07 (2000) (arguing that threshold retributivism is arbitrary not merely because 
it involves matters degree but, more problematically, because it involves the 
weighing of incommensurables). 
167  Husak, supra note 94, at 450. 
168  Id. at 451-52. 
169 Id. 
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due process rights and other protections against convicting the 
innocent), as well as utilitarian considerations such as crime 
prevention, rehabilitation and incapacitation. 
I will refer to this function of retributivism as “good reason 
retributivism.”170  On this understanding, retributivism does not 
supply an independently sufficient reason to punish, but it 
supplies a stronger justification than either the purely negative 
retributivism dictating that culpability is merely necessary to 
punishment or the permissive version dictating that culpability 
allows punishment.171  It is also distinct from the mixed theories of 
punishment that erect a fixed division of labor between retributive 
and non-retributive considerations, the best known of these being 
H.L.A. Hart’s contention that utilitarianism should establish the 
“general justifying aim” of punishment whereas retribution guides 
the “distribution” of punishment.172  Nor, unlike Hart’s view, is 
this type of retributivism vulnerable to the critique that it is, at 
root, a utilitarian theory through and through because its putative 
retributivism is in fact subservient to an overarching utilitarianism.  
While good reason retributivism does not claim that 
“[r]etributivism has no room for . . . other reasons,”173 and is thus 
an entirely sufficient theory of punishment, it nevertheless offers 
an understanding of retributivism that is internally independent of 
other rationales.  In other words, the conclusion that culpability 
provides an intrinsically good reason to punish does not derive its 
force from non-retributive considerations. 
In describing good reason retributivism as a type of 
retributivism, I do not attempt to carve out a unique justification 
for punishment that is distinct from those I have surveyed.  Rather, 
my aim is to say something about how retributivism can function 
as an applied principle of criminal justice, whatever its theoretical 
underpinnings.  For example, this understanding of retributivism 
                                                     
170  I borrow here from Leo Zaibert, who writes that “[r]etributivism is 
always, in every context, at least a good reason for punishing.”  ZAIBERT, supra 
note 16, at 201-02. 
171  See supra Part 2.1. 
172  H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 9 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that “it is perfectly consistent to assert both that the 
General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment is its beneficial 
consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified or 
restricted out of deference to principles Distribution which require that 
punishment should only be of an offender for an offence”). 
173  See Moore, supra note 22, at 88-89. 
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flows directly from the consequentialist retributivist view that 
retributive goods must be balanced against other goods.  It 
likewise flows from a deontological position that acknowledges 
limits to the scope and weight of retributive duties. 
Good reason retributivism also leaves room for differing views 
regarding the relative force of retributive considerations for 
particular institutional decisions.  Moore’s threshold deontology 
contemplates that utilitarian factors will trump retributive duties 
only in extraordinary cases.174  Husak, by contrast, attributes a 
weaker force to these duties, arguing that the justification for 
punishment always requires non-retributive reasons because, “At 
most, the obligation of the state to punish is contingent on ‘other 
things being equal’—which surely they are not.”175  Leo Zaibert 
offers an intermediate formulation according to which “punishing 
the deserving is prima facie the right thing to do,”176 but in which 
this presumption favoring punishment is always subject to being 
outweighed by the force of other values.177 
A retributivism so defined unavoidably introduces 
indeterminacy, some of which I have already explored.  
Nevertheless, as I argue in this Part, the idea that desert supplies a 
prima facie reason to punish is one that has powerful normative 
force for ICL, and that, even if unacknowledged, resonates with 
much contemporary thinking about the field.  It provides a 
framework for understanding the design of international criminal 
justice institutions such as the ICC, and a basis for shoring up the 
legitimacy of international justice efforts in the face of what are 
often uncertain social consequences. 
                                                     
174  See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text. 
175  Husak, supra note 94, at 453. 
176  ZAIBERT, supra note 16, at 215. 
177  Zaibert defends this approach to retributivism based on the same types of 
intuitive examples that Moore draws from.  Just as intuition may tell us that 
punishing the deserving is intrinsically good irrespective of whether it yields 
additional good consequences, so may it lead a punisher—whether a parent 
reprimanding a child or a judge convicting a criminal—to simultaneously weigh 
both retributive and non-retributive considerations.  While there is “no principled 
way of ranking these different factors in a systematic, general way,” nevertheless 
“[i]n some cases,” argues Zaibert, “some . . . factors will have preeminence and in 
other cases other factors.”  Id. at 214.  Other criminal law scholars have also taken 
a pluralistic approach to punishment theory, endorsing a retributivism that 
operates alongside other punishment rationales.  See Michael Cahill, Punishment 
Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY (Mark D. White ed., 
2011). 
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5.1. The Morality of Punishment 
At its core, a retributive account gives voice to the moral 
dimension of ICL, to the idea that horrific acts of mass violence 
deserve punishment in ways that are not reducible to anticipated 
social benefits.  I have already indicated reasons why this impulse 
cannot itself be sufficient to ground international criminal justice 
institutions in a world of limited resources, limited capacity, and 
competing values.  But the mere insufficiency of this impulse does 
not deprive it of normative force. 
To illustrate the point, consider Andrew Woods’ use of the 
famous trolley problem to support his skepticism of an ICL rooted 
in the utility of desert.178  Faced with the scenario of an-out-control 
trolley set to strike and kill five workers, respondents 
overwhelmingly accept the permissibility of taking action to divert 
the train to a different track where it will instead strike and kill just 
one worker.179  But respondents overwhelmingly have the opposite 
reaction to a variant of the scenario in which the only way to save 
the five lives is to shove an extraordinarily heavy person off the 
front of the trolley in order to brake the vehicle.180  Summarizing 
research conducted by Joshua D. Greene, Woods notes that 
“people tend toward consequentialism when emotions are not 
involved, but when emotions run high (as when people imagine 
themselves pushing someone to their death), they rely on a moral 
heuristic (“Do no harm”).”181  Given the high emotions that 
typically accompany international crimes, he concludes that “[t]he 
risk that strong moral intuitions may guide decisionmakers to 
outcomes that do not maximize utility may be particularly 
pronounced at the international level.”182  
That is one way to characterize the distinction between these 
two scenarios.  Another is to say that the reactions affirm a deeply 
seeded, non-instrumental norm against killing for which the first 
                                                     
178  See Woods, supra note 7, at 667-68 (suggesting that people tend toward 
consequentialism when emotions are “not involved”, but when “emotions run 
high”, people rely on a “moral heuristic”).  See also Judith Jarvis Thompson, The 
Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1404-06 (1985) (describing the “trolley 
problem”). 
179 Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, 3 MORAL PSYCHOL. 35, 24 
(2007); Thompson, supra note 178, at 1395.  
180  Greene, supra note 179, at 24; Thompson, supra note 178, at 1409. 
181  See Woods, supra note 7, at 667-68 (summarizing Greene, supra note 179). 
182  Id. 
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trolley scenario carves out a very limited exception for harm-
reducing actions that merely redirect a pre-existing threat not 
created by the one who diverts the trolley.183  To be clear, Woods’ 
own purpose in invoking the trolley case is not to engage a broader 
debate between utilitarianism and deontology, but instead to 
critique the utility-of-desert justification for ICL by demonstrating 
that the kinds of moral intuitions that undergird desert-based 
thinking may not always produce the optimal social consequences 
that the utility-of-desert theory itself seeks.184  More broadly, 
however, Woods’ analysis raises the question of whether it is even 
worthwhile to pursue an account of ICL (or of criminal law more 
broadly) that relies exclusively on utilitarian reasoning without 
affording retributive considerations a role.  This question arises 
directly for Woods because, although he expressly brackets actual 
retributive theory as being outside the scope of his analysis,185 this 
exclusion does not prevent him from exploring concrete policy 
suggestions favoring non-punitive alternatives to international 
criminal justice.186 
If one accepts, as retributivists do, that there is intrinsic good to 
punishing perpetrators of horrific offenses, and perhaps a moral 
obligation to do so, then good reason retributivism can offer a 
corrective to utilitarian theories by acknowledging a non-
consequentialist moral dimension to punishment.  That this 
consideration must coexist uneasily and indeterminately with non-
retributive considerations necessarily limits its normative power, 
                                                     
183  This is Judith Jarvis Thompson’s explanation in her seminal article on the 
trolley problem.  See Thompson, supra note 178, at 112 (positing a “distributive 
exemption” that is “very conservative” and “permits intervention into the world 
to get an object that already threatens death to those many to instead threaten 
death to these few, but only by acts that are not themselves gross impingements 
on the few.  That is, the intervener must not use means that infringe stringent 
rights of the few in order to get his distributive intention carried out.”). 
184  See Woods, supra note 7, at 669 (noting that “[t]he risk that strong moral 
intuitions may guide decision-makers to outcomes that do not maximize utility 
may be particularly pronounced at the international level . . . .”). 
185  Id. at 634 n.2 (“I do not seek to spark a debate about the merits of 
retributivism vis-à-vis consequentialism.  Instead, I am concerned solely here with 
evaluating the claim that the regime’s current retributive stance will produce 
favorable consequences.”). 
186  Id. at 674-81.  Woods does caution that these suggestions “are not 
included here as fully developed policy prescriptions, and in fact there may be 
good normative reasons for not adopting some of them; that analysis is outside 
the scope of this Article.”  Id. at 674.  One such “good normative reason” may be 
that provided by the retributive theory. 
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but this weakness is also counterbalanced by the fact that the 
contemporary practice of ICL often operates under conditions of 
significant uncertainty regarding contributions to social utility.  
Accordingly, even a weak retributivism operating akin to a 
rebuttable presumption can play an important tie-breaking role. 
Take, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, established by the UN Security Council in 1993 
as a measure to restore international peace and security.187  The 
idea that the ICTY could promote peace by deterring crimes in the 
conflict ongoing at the time is one that has justifiably attracted 
skepticism,188 and indeed, many scholars reject deterrence as a 
viable goal of ICL more generally.189  Hope that prosecutions 
would promote ethnic reconciliation have yielded to skepticism, as 
that goal has proven elusive and surveys indicate that many in the 
Balkans take a dim view of the ICTY’s work and continue to deny 
the atrocities that have been the focus of the Court’s work. 
At the same time, the former Yugoslavia has avoided a return 
to war during the major years of the Tribunal’s operation, and 
several of its successor states have embarked on a moderating 
course toward European integration.190  There is a case to be made 
                                                     
187  S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. & Dec., U.N. Doc. S/INF/49, at 
93 (1993) (acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish the ICTY).  The 
Council expresses in particular the belief that “the establishment of an 
international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for the above-
mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to 
ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed.”  Id. 
188  See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (“In the adolescence of ad hoc tribunals, 
the cardinal importance of general deterrence was frequently invoked.  The 
exaltation of this goal flowed from the hope that the mere threat of punishment 
would produce a moderating effect on the brutalities of conflicts.  But as the threat 
failed to prevent horrendous atrocities, initial optimism surrounding this objective 
failed.”).  One might speculate, though, that the ICTY’s existence played a 
deterrent role in Macedonia, which saw some hostilities in 2001 but arrived at a 
peaceful resolution that avoided the catastrophic violence experiences in other 
former Yugoslav republics.  See Lauren Comiteau, Bosnia Twenty Years On – Part 2: 
ICTY Failure to Deter?, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Apr. 10, 2012, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/bosnia-twenty-years-part-2-
icty-failure-deter (quoting former ICTY employee Refik Hodzic as saying, “I 
believe the Tribunal has served as a deterrent in Macedonia, during the conflict 
there in 2001 . . . .”).  The 2001 hostilities produced one conviction at the ICTY.  See 
Prosecutor v. Boškovski & Tarulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (upholding conviction of Tarulovski 
for war crimes and acquittal of Boškovski). 
189  See supra note 18. 
190  Croatia joined the European Union in July 2013.  See Dan Bilefsky, Joyous 
Croatia Joins Europe Amid a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A4.  The incentive of 
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that the ICTY aided this transition, for example by facilitating the 
incapacitation (through both incarceration and self-imposed exile) 
of extremist leaders during this period.191  It is also noteworthy that 
the period of the ICTY’s trial of Slobodan Miloševic, when Serbia’s 
former dictator scored high marks with the Serbian public for his 
performance on the defense stand (an apparent sign of tribunal 
inefficacy) also coincided with a period of increasing moderation in 
Serbian politics that saw repeated electoral defeats for Miloševic’s 
former party (a possible sign of tribunal efficacy).192 
The truth, however, is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
reach precise conclusions about the ICTY’s efficacy.  That is 
because a punishment theory aimed at advancing broad societal 
change does not easily lend itself to the kind of empirical 
verification necessary to validate the theory.  One simply cannot 
say how things would look in former Yugoslavia today had the 
ICTY never existed.  Moreover, the tribunal’s apparent successes 
benefitted from developments—including support from 
international forces stationed in Bosnia and a popular revolution in 
Serbia—that were outside the control of the ICTY and were not 
foreseeable at the time the Security Council established the 
Court.193 
Other examples involve similar uncertainty.  For instance, it is 
today very uncertain whether the ICC’s arrest warrants against 
Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony and Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir will ever produce a trial and, if they do, what impact the 
trials will have in Uganda and Sudan respectively.194  This 
uncertainty is troublesome for utilitarian approaches to ICL which 
                                                     
possible EU membership is credited with facilitating a landmark power-sharing 
agreement between Serbia and Kosovo concluded last April.  See Dan Bilefsky, 
Serbia and Kosovo Reach Agreement on Power Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2013, at 
A9. 
191  See generally Greenawalt, supra note 135; see also Luban, supra note 10, at 
575 (“[I]ncapacitating toxic political leaders—a Goering, a Milosevic, a Charles 
Taylor—can be absolutely crucial.”). 
192  See generally Florian Bieber, The Show and the Trial: The Political Death of 
Miloševic, in THE MILOŠEVIC TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY (Timothy William Waters ed., 
2013). 
193  See generally Greenawalt, supra note 135. 
194  See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Cases and Situations: 
Darfur, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=darfur; Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, Cases and Situations: Northern Uganda, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=uganda (explaining the ICC investigations into the 
situations in Darfur and Uganda). 
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are concerned exclusively with the social consequences of 
punishment.  A good reason retributivist, by contrast, has an easier 
time defending a broadly aspirational model of ICL because 
uncertain social aspirations are supplemented by the intrinsic good 
of punishing the guilty, a good which itself provides a prima facie 
reason to proceed.  Indeed, under these circumstances, the 
morality of punishing the guilty can provide an independent 
source of legitimacy for international criminal tribunals, one that 
arms courts with a shield—a partial one at least—against pressures 
to produce demonstrable societal benefits in circumstances that are 
often resistant to empirical verification. 
4.2. Retributivism and the Structure of ICL 
I have just explored ways in which good-reason retributivism 
may provide a meaningful and normatively attractive rationale for 
ICL.  As a descriptive matter, this understanding of retributivism 
also supplies a useful lens for understanding the existing discourse 
and structure of ICL. 
At a rudimentary, if not especially meaningful, level, one can 
identify this understanding of retributivism in the commonly 
invoked aspiration “to put an end to impunity,” which appears in 
the statute of the ICC among other places195 and also in the 
common identification of retribution as one among several goals.196 
It also lends coherence to the fact that retributivist thinking 
appears to dominate some institutional decisions more than others.  
For instance, it helps explain what Jens Ohlin describes as the 
“Rorschach test” quality of international justice according to which 
policymakers establishing international tribunals rely heavily on 
utilitarian thinking, but retributive considerations inform the 
determination of individual sentences.197 
One explanation of this disparity is that utilitarian impulses 
aimed at satisfying victim demands for retribution guide the entire 
enterprise.  Another explanation, however, the one offered by good 
                                                     
195  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at pmbl. 
196  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
197  Ohlin, supra note 9, at 392.  
When one evaluates the practice of institutions, one considers the fate of 
collectives and the consequentialist goals of peace and security take 
centre focus, but when one evaluates the sentences of particular 
individuals, then one focuses more tightly on retributive concerns: the 
offender, his crime, and the moral gravity of the offence.  Id. 
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reason retributivism, is that retributive and non-retributive 
considerations operate in tandem to address both types of 
questions, with the relative force of these considerations 
depending on the type of institutional decision in question.  A 
decision to establish an international criminal tribunal to address a 
particular episode of mass atrocity is one that, by its nature, invites 
significant non-retributive thinking because retributive theory is ill 
equipped to determine the necessary resource allocations, and the 
high-stakes contexts of societal transition that often accompany 
international prosecutions focus particular attention on the 
implications of trials for international peace and security.198  The 
intrinsic good of deserved punishment remains a relevant factor, 
but it does not provide an exclusive criterion for decision.  
Sentencing, by contrast, is the type of decision for which 
retributivism provides more concrete guidance, and for which 
considerations of peace and security, by contrast, are less likely to 
override individual punitive judgments.  Perhaps this is because 
these judgments involve a degree of specificity that does not 
directly implicate peace and security, or as Ohlin argues, because 
desert-based sentences best advance tribunals’ policy goals, thus 
producing a correspondence between retributive and non-
retributive aims.199 
The idea that culpability provides a prima facie, but not 
exclusive, reason to punishment also illuminates the particular 
structure and context of the ICC, which is unique among 
international criminal tribunals in that it is a permanent treaty—
based court with broad geographic reach.  It is tempting to 
conclude, as Woods does, that the ICC is emblematic of an 
“international criminal regime [that] is largely limited to 
backward-looking sanctions, the only form of accountability 
compatible with retributivism.”200  This statement is true in the 
sense that the ICC, like other tribunals, imposes punishment on 
those suspects it convicts.  Whether the international criminal 
regime is “limited to backward-looking sanctions,” depends in 
large part on how one defines the international criminal regime.  
With the ICC thus far only targeting a handful of suspects for each 
                                                     
198  See supra Part 4. 
199  Ohlin, supra note 9, at 390-91. 
200  Woods, supra note 7, at 640. 
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situation it has investigated201—and lacking the resources to do 
much more—the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of 
those responsible for mass atrocities will never face prosecution by 
international criminal tribunals. 
I have identified different reasons, some involving forward-
looking aspirations, why a state might in good faith wish or need 
to limit its legal response to mass atrocity.202  A system of ICL that 
insists on prosecuting only the most culpable high-level 
perpetrators remains compatible, whether by happenstance or 
design, with the view that states should be afforded substantial 
discretion over how to balance forward and backward-looking 
considerations in their handling of most perpetrators. 
One important way in which the ICC does reflect a strong 
commitment to punitive justice is the unprecedented discretion 
that the Court’s statute gives to legal professionals over the 
direction of the Court’s mission.  Unlike ad hoc tribunals, which 
emerge out of policy decisions by the UN Security Council or 
individual state governments to focus prosecutions on particular 
situations of mass atrocity, the ICC leaves it in many cases to 
prosecutorial and judicial actors to determine when situations 
involving alleged international crimes merit the Court’s attention.  
So long as the crimes in question are committed on the territory of 
or by a citizen of a state party to the ICC, the drafting history and 
relevant treaty language reflect a determination that these 
judgments focus primarily on formal, culpability-based criteria, 
rather than the types of broad-based policy judgments one might 
expect from a political actor like the Security Council.203  
Accordingly, the Rome Statute reflects a strong presumption that 
prosecution should follow the commission of international crimes, 
even if those efforts are necessarily targeted against a select 
handful of perpetrators. 
This presumption in favor of prosecution, however, is not 
absolute, as the Rome Statute leaves significant room for the 
Court’s prosecutor and judges to consider non-retributive 
rationales.  For instance, the Prosecutor, subject to judicial review, 
may determine that proceeding with an otherwise admissible case 
                                                     
201 Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20c
ases.aspx. 
202  See supra Part 4. 
203  See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 590-98. 
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is not “in the interests of justice.”204  Also, the Court’s 
complementarity framework requires the Court to defer to the 
genuine investigations and prosecutions conducted by states with 
jurisdiction over offenders otherwise sought by the Court.205 
Attention has focused on whether these provisions may in some 
circumstances require or permit deference to alternative justice 
mechanisms such as South Africa’s individualized amnesty 
process.206  Moreover, the UN Security Council retains authority to 
defer ICC proceedings for one year at a time, when it deems it to be 
in the interest of international peace and security to do so.207 
Finally, at a less formal but nevertheless critical level, the ICC 
remains a weak institution, dependent upon states both to supply 
its limited funding and to apprehend and surrender fugitive 
suspects to the Court.  As such, the threat of non-cooperation 
imposes a significant restraint on the Court’s authority to act on 
retributive impulses that are not shared by the states whose 
cooperation is essential.208  Non-cooperation, of course, is a blunt 
tool, and in many cases—for example, when the non-cooperating 
authorities are themselves behind the crimes in question—such 
non-cooperation will elicit rightful condemnation, and the Court’s 
                                                     
204  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 53. 
205  Id. at art. 17. 
206  See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: 
Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 
107 (2009); Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507 (1999); Carsten Stahn, 
Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretive 
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 695 (2005). 
207  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 16. 
208  The ICC has faced particular resistance from many African states in its 
efforts to arrest Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.  The African Union has repeatedly criticized 
the arrest warrants, resolving that “AU Member States shall not cooperate . . . [in] 
the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.”  Assembly of 
the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.391-415(XVIII), ¶ 3 (Jan. 30, 2012).  A 
number of African members of the ICC have received Bashir on state visits 
without moving to arrest or extradite him.  See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) 
of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the 
Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and 
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to 
Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the 
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 12, 2011). 
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moral authority to demand retributive justice will survive 
undiminished.  However, non-cooperation can also provide an 
important check on the Court’s ability to proceed in more difficult 
cases, in which the Court’s efforts to secure justice find themselves 
in tension with powerful non-retributive considerations. This risk, 
combined with the general need to conserve resources, provides a 
powerful incentive for the Court to focus its efforts on the cases 
that are least likely to present compelling non-retributive 
arguments for non-prosecution. 
In sum, although the ICC is a court that dispenses retributive 
justice, the question of how it contributes to a broader international 
criminal regime is complex.  Good reason retributivism provides a 
rich way of framing this complexity.  In important ways, the Rome 
Statute endorses the view that culpability is a prima facie reason to 
punish.  At the same time, mechanisms and restraints both within 
and outside the treaty make it possible to check that impulse when 
overriding non-retributive considerations so dictate. 
6. THE LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT THEORY 
I now briefly consider the practical implications of 
retributivism in comparison to other approaches to ICL.  Despite 
significant theoretical differences among the various rationales for 
punishment, I suspect that debates over punishment theory have 
less practical significance for the field than might be supposed.  On 
the one hand, the current evolution of ICL reflects certain core 
areas of agreement that are backed by persuasive arguments under 
multiple approaches to punishment. In this way, the core of 
international criminal law is overdetermined by punishment 
theory.  On the other hand, with respect to many of the most 
difficult questions confronting international criminal law, the 
dominant theories do not speak with sufficient specificity to 
provide fixed answers.  This indeterminacy has multiple causes.  In 
the case of retributivism, I have already argued that alternate 
conceptions of retributivism can point in different directions and 
that retributive theory alone does not supply a complete theory of 
punishment.  Instead, real-world implementation efforts require 
retributive considerations to be balanced against non-retributive 
considerations.  This balancing is inherently indeterminate, and 
can support a range of policy positions. 
Utilitarian approaches, by contrast, do in theory provide a 
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complete theory of punishment.209  As Cahill explains,  
Utilitarianism, which bases punishment on the 
forward-looking goal of preventing future crime, is not 
only a justificatory theory explaining why criminal 
punishment should exist, but also a prescriptive theory 
explaining how punishment institutions should work.  
The utilitarian agenda encompasses both the purposes 
and the practices of the criminal justice system, seeking 
in all cases and at all stages of the process to minimize 
or prevent social harms (in the most cost-effective 
way).210   
As such, this agenda provides a criterion—crime prevention—for 
the selection and ordering of various approaches to punishment—
such as deterrence, incapacitation, the utility of desert, the 
realization of expressive values, and so forth.  More broadly, it also 
provides a criterion—utility maximization—to guide legislative 
choices between criminal justice initiatives and other priorities.  
Of course, the realization of this agenda requires agreement on 
how to define and measure utility, as well as adequate information 
regarding the likely consequences of social policy choices.  In a 
world of evaluative disagreement and imperfect information, it is 
far more challenging in practice to identify the demands of 
utilitarianism on many issues, including the contested questions of 
international criminal law that I consider here.211 
A comprehensive consideration of how the competing 
punishment rationales might inform international criminal justice 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, I will focus on few key 
policy questions, and suggest some general reasons for skepticism 
that punishment theory will play a decisive role in their resolution. 
6.1. Crimes 
Contemporary ICL focuses principally on offenses of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes that are both 
extraordinarily grave, and typically take place in the context of 
                                                     
209  See Cahill, supra note 11, at 817 (“In a meaningful way, utilitarianism 
provides a complete theory of criminal justice, while retributivism apparently 
does not.”). 
210  Id. at 818. 
211  See, e.g., Damaška, supra note 1, at 343-42 (“[N]o metric is available to 
establish a rigid set of priorities for the goals of adjudication: they are simply too 
disparate to be ranked against a common measure.”). 
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organized violence that is resistant to enforcement at the national 
level.212  A consensus that these core crimes should be a focus of 
ICL is unlikely to hinge on one’s general philosophy of 
punishment.  The basic building blocks of this consensus lie in a 
comparative assessment of domestic and international institutions.  
Given the functional and political considerations that make the 
criminal law (whatever its underlying goals) almost exclusively the 
province of domestic institutions, the role of ICL is predictably 
concerned with systematic atrocities for which domestic 
institutions are less reliable.213  The focus on crimes of special 
gravity, moreover, flows both from a retributive emphasis of 
individual culpability and with a utilitarian concern for preventing 
great societal harms.  As a prima facie matter, these are the types of 
crimes retributivists will most want to punish, and that utilitarians 
(whether relying on deterrence, incapacitation, expressive norm 
projection, the utility of desert, or some other rationale) will most 
wish to prevent. 
At the same time, this basic account of ICL fails to provide clear 
guidance on current debates regarding the outer limits of ICL.  One 
question concerns the reach of existing international offenses, all of 
which have seen significant historical evolution.  For instance, an 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber considering Kenya’s post-election violence 
found itself split over the breadth of crimes against humanity, 
whose elements under the Rome Statute require that these crimes 
involve participation in a “widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population” where the attack “is 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack.”214  A two-judge majority affirmed the Court’s 
jurisdiction and eventually confirmed charges against four 
suspects, reasoning in relevant part that the acts of non-state 
violence alleged exhibited sufficient organization to meet the 
statutory definition.215  A dissenting judge argued, by contrast, that 
                                                     
212  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
213  See supra Part 4. 
214  Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 7. 
215  See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in Kenya, ¶ 90 (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf (Majority Opinion) 
(“Whereas some have argued that only State-like organizations may qualify, the 
Chamber opines that the formal nature of a group and the level of its organization 
should not be the defining criterion.  Instead, as others have convincingly put 
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in cases of non-state crimes, the “organizational policy” 
requirement should be construed to involve the policies of a state-
like entity.216  The difference between these positions, not yet 
resolved by the ICC’s Appeals Chamber, has enormous 
implications for the reach of international criminal law into 
situations of non-state violence committed outside the context of 
armed conflict. 
Related questions concern the recognition of new international 
offenses.  Recent attention has focused on whether terrorism 
should be prosecuted as an international crime,217 and debate has 
also focused on the proposed inclusion of drug smuggling, slavery, 
apartheid, human trafficking, and piracy.218  The crime of 
aggression, prosecuted after World War II, but since abandoned by 
successor tribunals, has reignited controversy arising out of efforts 
to amend the Rome Statute to include the crime.219  One might also 
observe that even “ordinary” crimes such as domestic violence are 
often resistant to effective prosecution at the domestic level. 
Resolving these questions requires sorting through a host of 
                                                     
forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to 
perform acts which infringe on basic human values.”). 
216  See id. ¶ 90 (Kaul, J., dissenting) (interpreting Rome Statute requirement 
that crimes against humanity are “pursuant to state or organizational policy” to 
require involvement of an “entity which may act like a State or has quasi-State 
abilities”). 
217  Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (U.N. 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/main/filings/orders-and-decisions/appeals-
chamber/f0936. 
218  STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG 
LEGACY 22 (3d ed. 2009).  Despite states’ exercise of universal jurisdiction over the 
crime of piracy, Antonio Cassese argues that piracy does not implicate a 
“community value,” and thus does not rise to the level of a true international 
crime.  ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2008). 
219  In June 2010, the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties approved amending 
the Rome Statute to extend the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  
The Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-
ENG.pdf.  The amendment will not take effect unless it is ratified by at least 30 
parties, and receives the approval of at least two thirds of the Assembly of States 
Parties at the meeting to be held after January 1, 2017.  See id.; Rome Statute, supra 
note 67, at art. 121(3).  On the controversies surrounding the crime, see generally 
Sean D. Murphy, The Crime of Aggression, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF 
FORCE (2013). 
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issues concerning the limits of international law and international 
institutions that are not reducible to one’s preferred criminal 
theory, although different punishment justifications will suggest 
different limiting factors.  A contractarian retributivist might 
highlight the fragile political legitimacy of international 
institutions,220 whereas utilitarians and consequentialist 
retributivists might argue that international courts should direct 
their limited resources to only the most serious crimes involving 
the greatest social harms and the greatest moral culpability.  
Theorists of all stripes must worry that an overly expansive 
international criminal law will prove self-defeating by meeting 
strong resistance from states and eroding the perceived legitimacy 
of international institutions. 
These pragmatic considerations are especially significant for 
rationales that might otherwise favor a more expansive ICL.221  For 
instance, one might identify great expressive value in expanding 
ICL to embrace ordinary offenses—such as domestic violence—
that receive insufficient enforcement in many countries.222  
However, the fragility and weakness of international tribunals 
dealing with mass atrocity crimes argues in favor of relying on 
other institutions, such as human rights courts, to address states’ 
obligations respecting the broader set of offenses that invoke 
international concern. 
6.2.  Design and Alternatives to Prosecution 
I have explored how various understandings of retributive 
theory can embrace alternatives to international prosecution, such 
as the precedent set by South Africa’s Truth Reconciliation 
Commission.223  A utilitarian unconcerned about the intrinsic 
moral worth of retribution will likewise have little trouble 
accepting that societal interests can justify non-punitive or quasi-
                                                     
220  See supra Part 3. 
221  See, e.g., David Luban, Response to Crimes Against Humanity: Beyond 
Moral Minimalism, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 353, 356 (2006) (“On pragmatic grounds I 
agree that ICL should limit itself to serious crimes.  Its institutions lack the 
capacity to prosecute even major atrocities, let alone a more ambitious docket.  
That is not a principled objection, however.”). 
222  On the other hand, one might endorse the expressive value of 
highlighting only the absolute gravest offenses such as genocide and crimes 
against humanity.  In this way, the demands of an expressive account depend 
very much on that which one wishes to express. 
223  See supra Part 4. 
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punitive responses to mass atrocity.  But the fact that multiple 
approaches to punishment converge on the theoretical desirability 
of alternative mechanisms does little to resolve the problems 
inherent in assessing the justifiability of particular alternatives in 
concrete situations. 
A central complexity is that arguments favoring alternative 
processes tend to be context specific.  It may well be that South 
Africa’s response to apartheid was the best available option under 
the circumstances, but that response will not provide a one-size-
fits-all solution for other situations involving very different 
historical and political contexts.  Moreover, judgments about what 
type of response, if any, should be pursued in particular 
circumstances necessarily rely on imperfect information and are 
resistant to empirical verification.224 
As a result, the underlying dilemmas of transitional justice 
present difficult questions of institutional design for an 
international system whose existence manifests a determination to 
limit state discretion over punishment matters.  The establishment 
of the ICC reflected, in part, a dissatisfaction with the discretionary 
and politicized system of ad hoc tribunals, in which the underlying 
balancing is entrusted to the political actors who determine 
whether or not to establish a tribunal for a particular situation.225  
But there are also complexities to having international 
prosecutorial and judicial officers decide these questions without 
the benefit of meaningful legal criteria or the kind of democratic 
accountability to affected societies that might otherwise justify the 
delegation of policymaking to legal officials.  Accordingly, debate 
persists over how the ICC should approach arguments for 
deference to non-traditional proceedings.226 
                                                     
224  See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text. 
225  See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 590-98 (summarizing the drafting debates 
and their resolution in the ICC). 
226  For some suggested proposals for how the ICC should approach such 
questions, see, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 187-91 (proposing that alternative 
justice mechanisms be evaluated for (1) good faith; (2) democratic legitimacy; (3) 
the characteristics of the violence the procedures seek to address, as well as the 
current political climate; (4) the avoidance of gratuitous or iterated punishment; 
(5) the effect of the procedures on the universal substance; and (6) the preclusion 
of the infliction of great evils on others); Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with 
Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 
23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 261-65 (2008) (arguing that alternative justice mechanisms 
merit deference by the ICC when they are necessary, legitimate, and advance 
international justice to the same degree that the exercise of ICC jurisdiction 
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The debate over alternative justice also raises tensions between 
the local and global ambitions of international criminal justice.  For 
instance, a deterrence theorist might express concern that 
embracing an alternative justice mechanism, whatever the benefits 
to the local community, will dilute the ability of ICL to deter future 
crime in other regions.  But this concern carries little weight if one 
believes that the deterrent effect of international justice is too weak 
to carry weight in the first instance, or that deterrence is more 
likely to work in a more specific, situation-by-situation manner.  
Likewise, an expressivist might be concerned that foregoing 
prosecution in one context inhibits the law’s ability to send a global 
message about the wrongfulness of international crimes.  Yet this 
argument begs the question of whether traditional prosecution is 
the only way to send this message, and whether that is the only 
message to send. 
In raising these questions, I am not arguing that punishment 
theory is irrelevant to the problems of alternative justice.  
However, addressing these issues requires more specific 
arguments than can be provided merely by endorsing a general 
approach to punishment. 
6.3. Case Selection 
International criminal trials are characterized by extreme 
selectivity. Restrained by limited resources and limited 
enforcement ability, they have prosecuted only a small handful of 
participants in mass atrocities that often involve many thousands 
of perpetrators.  The burden of undertaking more extensive trials is 
left to national authorities, who may or may not do so.  A complete 
theory of international criminal law must come to terms with this 
selectivity and provide guidance to decision makers. 
International practice has converged on the idea that 
international criminal tribunals should give priority to prosecuting 
the highest level perpetrators who bear the greatest criminal 
responsibility.227  This intuitive policy is readily defensible under 
multiple approaches to punishment.  To the extent that 
retributivism can, in fact, guide questions of case selection—as for 
                                                     
would); Stahn, supra note 206.  I have argued that the very delegation of these 
questions to the ICC raises problems of institutional legitimacy.  See generally 
Greenawalt, supra note 7. 
227  See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 627-29 (surveying the historical practice of 
international criminal tribunals in focusing on high-level offenders). 
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example under the consequentialist retributivist model I have 
outlined—then it will favor targeting more blameworthy offenders 
over less blameworthy ones.228  For those focused on the utility of 
desert, the unique symbolic importance of leadership figures 
dictates that their prosecution will generally be a public priority, 
such that failure to prosecute those perceived to be the most 
responsible will be more detrimental than a failure to punish lower 
level perpetrators.  Leadership figures are also a natural target for 
deterrence theorists:  they are generally better situated to prevent 
crimes than are individual, low-level actors, and their smaller 
numbers make it more predictable that they will be targeted.  
Where there is a risk of continuing or future atrocities, 
incapacitation may be a plausible ambition for certain individual 
high level figures who are in a unique position to cause great 
harm.  The generally greater culpability and unique symbolic 
status of high-level figures is also likely to imbue their 
prosecutions with greater expressive value. 
But this general consensus only solves so much.  There may be 
situations, for example, where a leadership figure’s relatively low 
degree of criminal responsibility creates a tension between 
pursuing the highest level perpetrators and the most responsible 
perpetrators.  In cases where crimes are committed by multiple 
sides to a conflict, there is value to prosecuting at least some 
offenders from all sides, even if the handful of worst offenders is 
clustered on one side of the conflict.229  Sometimes, also, there may 
be unique expressive value to highlighting certain types of 
offenses—for example, in order to call public attention to the 
prevalence of sexual crimes in war—even if, under the 
circumstance, doing so requires the prosecution of some lower-
level offenders.  In all these cases, moreover, there may be doubt 
about how precisely to weigh the gravity of a particular offender’s 
criminal contribution. 
A similar set of problems concern which general situations 
should be selected for prosecution in the first instance.  In the case 
of ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, the political actors who set up the 
tribunals have already selected the situations.  At the ICC, 
however, the Court’s prosecutor is largely responsible for 
                                                     
228  See supra Part 4.3.1. 
229  I have argued this point elsewhere.  See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 647–
50. 
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determining where the Court will focus its investigations.230  As a 
general matter one can agree that the Court should focus on the 
situations of the highest gravity, but there may be reasons to 
deviate from purely gravity-based criteria, perhaps because, for 
any number of reasons, the Court’s intervention is more likely to 
benefit one society more than another, because the Prosecutor 
wishes to call attention to a particular type of crime, or because one 
situation offers a higher probability of apprehending suspects than 
does another. 
All of these examples raise the possibility of a conflict between 
desert-based considerations and other considerations and so would 
appear to create a wedge between many retributivists and 
utilitarians.  However, the differences are not as straightforward as 
they might first appear.  A consequentialist retributivist, for 
example, could justify an expressive project to highlight sex crimes 
at the international level on the grounds that doing so might lead 
national legal systems to take these offenses more seriously, even 
if, as I have hypothesized, doing so requires a focus on lower level 
offenders.  Alternately, if prosecuting perpetrators on all sides of a 
conflict promotes the perceived legitimacy of a tribunal, a 
retributivist can endorse this approach on the ground that it will 
promote the rule of law in affected societies and thereby facilitate 
national prosecutions of additional offenders. 
On the other hand, utilitarian approaches that deviate too 
much from retributive principles risk backfiring.  One advantage of 
desert-based decision-making is that it upholds a conventional 
picture of prosecutors as legal actors who act based on neutral 
criteria.  A prosecutor who relies excessively on non-retributive 
considerations risks being perceived as an overtly political actor, 
thereby undermining the perceived legitimacy of international 
proceedings.  Moreover, it is far from clear that prosecutors are 
well positioned to predict the impact of their discretionary choices.  
To take just one example, the ICC’s very first trial focused 
exclusively on war crimes charges related to the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers.231  The expressive ambition apparent in the 
                                                     
230  So long as she is dealing with crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, the 
Prosecutor has the authority to refer situations to the Court involving crimes 
committed on the territory of or by a citizen of any state party to the Rome 
Statute.  See Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 12. 
231  Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at www.icc-
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decision to shine a spotlight on these particular offenses found 
itself threatened by criticism that the prosecution had ignored the 
accused Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s apparent culpability for more 
serious crimes involving rape, murder, and torture.232  Cases such 
as these certainly do not invalidate the relevance of expressive and 
other non-retributive considerations, but they do suggest that 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion that depart too far from 
retributive thinking risk being self-defeating. 
6.4. Sentencing 
My final example focuses on sentencing policy.  International 
tribunal statutes have afforded relatively little attention to 
sentencing policy, and have left the determination of punishments 
primarily to the discretion of judges.  There are powerful reasons 
                                                     
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
232  See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 2, at 273 (“[S]ome argue that the 
prosecutor was wrong to charge the Court’s first defendant, Thomas Lubanga, 
only with recruiting child soldiers when there was evidence that he was also 
responsible for crimes of sexual violence and other serious war crimes.”); Marlise 
Simons, Congolese Rebel Convicted of Using Child Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, 
at A12 (noting that the judgment against Lubanga “underscores some of the 
failings and limits of the prosecution’s approach.  The rebels under Mr. Lubanga’s 
command were known to have pillaged, raped and killed many civilians in 
enemy villages, but prosecutors said when he was handed to The Hague in 2006 
that the best evidence they had was about child recruiting”); William Schabas, 
Lubanga Sentenced to Fourteen Years (July 13, 2012), 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2012/07/lubanga-sentence-to-
fourteen-years.html  (“There is a widespread view circulating by which the 
Lubanga trial did not deal with the real issue, which is sexual assault.”).  That 
prosecutors may have limited the charges principally for lack of sufficient 
evidence at the time the charges were brought does not alter the expressive 
ambitions manifest in the decision to choose this particular defendant for the 
ICC’s first trial.  Marlise Simons, Congolese Rebel Convicted of Using Child Soldiers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A12.  Notably, Lubanga was already in custody in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) on charges of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, murder, illegal detention, and torture at the time that the ICC issued its 
arrest warrant, a fact suggesting that the Court should have deferred to the 
domestic proceedings under the Rome Statute’s Article 17 complementarity 
provision.  See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision 
Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision 10 February 2006 and the 
Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 33 (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.pdf.  Although the Pre-Trial Chamber determined 
that the DRC was willing and able to prosecute the accused, it nevertheless found 
the case admissible on the ground that the DRC proceedings involved different 
crimes than the ones before the ICC.  Id. ¶¶ 34-33.  Hence, the ICC proceedings 
had the effect of precluding Lubanga’s prosecution on more serious charges. 
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dictating that the most culpable offenders should be sentenced to 
substantial periods of incarceration commensurate with their 
desert.  This policy comports with the retributive principles and 
also with rationales that emphasize the utility of desert.  Robert 
Sloane has likewise argued that the expressive goals of 
international criminal law are best served by a proportional 
sentencing scheme.233  As Jens Ohlin has observed, moreover, 
rehabilitative rationales that sometimes favor lower sentences in 
the domestic context extend less easily to high-level ICL offenders 
who have committed especially grave offenses and are not likely to 
reform.234 
Nevertheless, a general commitment to desert-based 
punishment only goes so far.  As I have already explored, it 
supports a practice of ordinal proportionality—punishing more 
blameworthy offenders to longer sentences than less blameworthy 
offenders—but fails to resolve questions of cardinal 
proportionality that concern the general harshness of punishments 
across the scale.235  Moreover, the seemingly less controversial 
matter of ordinal proportionality raises unique complications for 
international criminal law.  First, the implementation of ordinal 
proportionality requires agreement regarding the relevant 
population of offenders.  A practice of proportionality that 
compares ICL offenses only to other ICL offenses will likely 
produce a broader range of sentences—and thus greater leniency at 
the lower end—than one that compares ICL offenses to ordinary 
domestic crimes.236 
Of course, making comparisons between offenses can itself 
involve great complexity.  The frequently collective nature of ICL 
offenses can make it difficult to evaluate the relative contributions 
of individuals to the larger crime.  Debate has focused on whether 
there is a hierarchy of international offenses, and on how to define 
and rank the various modes of participation that criminal 
                                                     
233  See Sloane, supra note 3, at 81-85.  See also Ohlin, supra note 9, at 386-87 
(arguing that if “the whole point of [ICL] sentences is to express society’s 
condemnation of such horrendous activity[,] . . . then clearly we want to express 
that genocide and crimes against humanity are far greater crimes than single cases 
of murder.”). 
234  See Ohlin, supra note 9, at 386-87. 
235  See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
236  See id. 
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culpability assumes.237  There is also the question of which 
additional mitigating or aggravating factors should inform 
culpability assessments.  Notably, the context of organized mass 
violence—the very aggravating feature that defines ICL offenses—
also arguably mitigates the culpability of some otherwise law 
abiding participants whose criminal guilt is in large part the result 
of an altered normative universe established by collectively 
sanctioned—sometimes state-ordered—violence.238  This 
relationship between the individual and the collective presents a 
defining challenge for ICL sentencing.  Thus far, international 
sentencing has proceeded on an ad hoc basis without the benefit of 
formalized sentencing guidelines or shared understandings 
regarding how to compare international and domestic offenses. 
7. CONCLUSION 
A reader of international criminal scholarship might be 
forgiven for thinking that it’s not possible to be a retributivist 
about international criminal law.  Some ICL specialists have 
dismissed retributive approaches as uniquely incompatible with 
the specific context of international crime.  Others have ignored 
their contribution entirely, or referenced them only in passing. 
This Article responds to the anti-retributivist strain by 
providing a qualified defense of a retributivist ICL.  In mounting 
this defense, I have not attempted to resolve longstanding debates 
over the general justification of punishment, or to argue for 
retributivism’s general superiority over utilitarian rationales.  
Instead, I have sought to show how someone committed to 
                                                     
237  See Danner, supra note 9; supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
238  RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 50 (2000) (noting “the diminished sense 
of blameworthiness and related criminal responsibility associated with periods of 
nondemocratic rule”); Luban, supra note 10 (noting that “[t]he kinds of mass 
violence that ICL addresses take place within what participants regard as 
struggles to the death between groups, in which killing and humiliating the 
enemy likewise seems like a supremely meaningful form of violence”); W. 
Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human 
Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (Autumn 1996).  
In many of the most hideous international crimes, many of the 
individuals who are directly responsible operate within a cultural 
universe that inverts our morality and elevates their actions to the 
highest form of group, tribe, or national defense . . . .  [T]he perpetrators 
may not have had the moral choice that is central to our notion of 
criminal responsibility.  Id.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:07 AM 
1044 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:4 
retributivist precepts can indeed make sense out of ICL, and do so 
in a way that takes complex account of ICL’s distinguishing 
characteristics. 
My account is qualified because it acknowledges that 
retributivism cannot provide a complete theory of ICL, but must 
instead co-exist with non-retributive rationales.  This qualification, 
however, does not derive from any special feature of the 
international context.  Instead it reflects the general limitations of 
retributivism as a real-world institutional theory. 
I have also highlighted the flexibility of retributive thinking, 
the ways in which it can support a broader range of policy 
outcomes—both affirming and rejecting international criminal 
prosecutions—than might be expected.  And I have indicated that 
many debates about international justice policy are unlikely to be 
resolved by the embrace of retributive principles. 
One might object that these qualifications emphasize the 
irrelevance of retributivism, and thus prove the point I have tried 
in this Article to resist.  But the concessions necessary to make 
retributivism plausible also allow one to appreciate the theory’s 
comparative strengths:  (1) Retributivism provides a compelling 
argument against punishing the innocent and punishing in excess 
of desert, and (2) it gives voice to the intuition that there is a moral 
case for punishing the worst atrocities that is not reducible to 
expected societal benefits. 
Accounts will differ as to how much weight the latter, 
affirmative argument is owed in high-stakes contexts that often 
accompany ICL offenses. But even a tie-breaking role will be 
significant given the difficulties inherent in predicting the impact 
of criminal trials on complex historical events.  And I suspect that 
this retributive impulse plays a greater role among supporters of 
international criminal institutions than is reflected by the common 
impulse to emphasize the benefits of prosecution.  If I am correct in 
this suspicion, then perhaps this Article’s principal contribution is 
to identify and explain the retributivist strain that already 
underlies much thinking about international criminal law.  
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